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OPTIMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR EMERGING NATURAL
RESOURCES: A CASE STUDY ON OWNING ATMOSPHERIC
MOISTURE
Jianlin Chen*
ABSTRACT
This Article critically examines the design of property rights for emerging natural
resources—naturally occurring substances that humans have only recently come to
be able to exploit viably—through a case study of how the fifty states allocate owner-
ship in, and regulate the use of, atmospheric moisture, an issue that has emerged in
the context of weather modification (particularly cloud seeding). Building on the
surprising finding that legislative declarations of state ownership have not resulted
in greater regulatory control or other substantial restrictions on private use, this
Article highlights a dimension of property rights design that has yet to receive con-
certed scholarly attention: the relative ease of future transitions—transitions both
in ownership and in control mechanisms. This Article explains how state property
facilitates easier and more holistic transitions and argues that state property can be
an optimal allocation of emerging natural resources, because uncertainty sur-
rounding the viability of present uses of the resource suggests that property rights
arrangements may need to be changed in the foreseeable future. More broadly, the
case study reveals how state property—properly stripped of its undeserved associa-
tions with socialism—still has an important role to play in property rights
literature.**
INTRODUCTION
Emerging natural resources are naturally occurring substances
that, while previously not considered valuable, are becoming in-
creasingly subject to economically viable exploitation because of
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technological advances or socioeconomic change.1 The question of
who is to own such resources inevitably accompanies their new-
found value, particularly for resources that could not be
meaningfully captured, modified, or utilized before recent techno-
logical innovations. For example, the advent of carbon
sequestration and heat mining has focused renewed attention on
the property rights to the space beneath the land surface.2 Simi-
larly, the increased policy emphasis on renewable energy
generation has generated legislative and regulatory actions con-
cerning the rights to sunlight and wind3—actions up to and
including nationalization.4 Several generations ago, amid the post-
WWII technological euphoria over weather modification, there ap-
peared a whole host of law review articles—including one aptly
titled “Who Owns the Clouds?” published in the inaugural volume
1. One good example is unconventional petroleum deposits. Manifestations previously
costly and/or difficult to extract are labeled “emerging” natural resources when high oil
prices and technological breakthroughs in drilling and refining significantly enhance the
economic potential of their extraction. Frank J. Atkins & Alan J. MacFadyen, A Resource Whose
Time Has Come? The Alberta Oil Sands as an Economic Resource, 29 ENERGY J. 77, 77–78 (2008)
(describing, in 2008, Canadian oil sands as “emerging resources”); Joseph L. Fisher, Natural
Resources and Technological Change, 29 LAND ECON. 57, 61–62 (1953) (discussing shale oil as an
“emerging natural resource” in 1953). The term has also been used to described natural
resources in the Arctic that may become exploitable upon the melting of the Arctic ice cap.
Thomas Au et al., The Arctic Ice Melt: Emerging Resources, Emerging Issues, 38 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 195,
195 (2013); Erika Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at the Legal Regimes in the
Arctic and the Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y. 32, 36 (2008).
2. Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore Space?, 9 WYO. L.
REV. 97, 99–109 (2009); John G. Spranking, Owning the Center of the Earth, 50 UCLA L. REV.
979, 1030–31 (2008); FRED BOSSELMAN, JIM ROSSI & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, ENERGY, ECO-
NOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 48–58 (Foundation Press 2000). Carbon sequestration is the
removal of carbon dioxide from the air and subsequent storage of it in deep subsurface
layers, to reduce greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. Anderson, supra, at 97–98. Heat mining
involves injecting water deep underground where it is then boiled by the natural under-
ground heat. The resulting steam can then be used to propel electricity-generating turbines.
John G. Spranking, supra, at 1030–31; BOSSELMAN, ROSSI & WEAVER, supra, at 48–50.
3. For a discussion of the policy considerations and proposed statutes relating to this
“right” to sunlight and wind, see Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 803, 823–26 (2013); David E. Missirian, Let the Sun Shine In: An Examination of
Solar Easements and a Proposed Statute, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 303 (2012); Sara C. Bronin, Solar
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1222–25 & 1237–50 (2009); BOSSELMAN, ROSSI & WEAVER, supra
note 2, at 36–40.
4. Heilong jiang sheng qihou ziyuan tance he baohu tiaoli [Heilong Jiang Province
Regulation on Climate Resources Survey and Protection], art. 7 (promulgated by Standing
Comm. Heilong Jiang People’s Cong., June 14, 2012, effective Aug. 1, 2012) (P.R.C.). For
critical discussion of this episode of regulating emerging natural resources, see Jianlin Chen
& Jiongzhe Cui, Property Rights Arrangement in Emerging Natural Resources: A Case Study of
China’s Nationalization of Wind and Sunlight, 27 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 81 (2013).
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of the Stanford Law Review in 19485—examining the ownership of
atmospheric moisture.6
The prominence of the issue of ownership is unsurprising, given
the copious literature addressing how profoundly the various forms
of property rights arrangements can affect the efficiency and redis-
tributive considerations of resource utilization.7 In particular,
scholars have claimed that implementing an appropriate property
rights regime is essential for avoiding both over-exploitation (the
tragedy of the commons8) and under-utilization (the tragedy of the
anticommons9). The same literature has also explored how the con-
trol mechanisms associated with a property rights regime—
mechanisms that may take the form of informal norms or formal
regulations—are crucial factors in whether the outcome is “com-
edy” or “tragedy.”10 Underpinning this rich discourse is a twofold
idea: first, that it is possible to specify a combination of ownership
and control mechanisms that will be optimally tailored to the char-
acteristics of the resource; and, second, that we should try to
implement that combination, notwithstanding the challenges that
5. Who Owns the Clouds?, 1 STAN. L. REV. 43 (1948).
6. E.g., Donald D. Stark, Weather Modification: Water. Three Cents per Acre-Foot?, 45 CAL. L.
REV. 698, 703–04 (1957); Derek H. Hene, The Legal Aspects of Rainmaking, 19 MOD. L. REV.
285, 285 (1956).
7. See infra Part II.A & Part II.B.
8. The tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals, in pursuit of their self-inter-
est, overexploit communally shared resources with little consideration of the costs of their
actions because they are borne by other individuals and society in general. Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). For more recent exposition and applica-
tions, see Gerd Winter, Rationing the Use of Common Resources: Problems of Design and
Constitutionality, in THE REGULATORY STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 129, 137 (Dawn
Oliver, Tony Prosser & Richard Rawlings eds., 2010); MOORE MCDOWELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS 337–43 (2d European ed. 2009); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 147–50 (4th ed. 2004).
9. The tragedy of the anticommons occurs when multiple entities hold rights of exclu-
sion to a scarce resource and transaction costs prevent effective coordination, leading to
holdout and the resulting underuse of the resource. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624–26
(1998). For more recent exposition and application, see Lea Kosnik, The Anticommons and the
Environment, 101 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 206 (2012); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellec-
tual Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anticommons
Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648, 654–56 (2007).
10. Gregg W. Kettles, Formal Versus Informal Allocation of Land in a Commons: The Case of
the MacArthur Park Sidewalk Vendors, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 49, 77–92 (2006); Hanoch Da-
gan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 581–602 (2001); ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE AC-
TION 15–21 (1990). See infra Part II.B.
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both inertia11 and interest group politics12 may present to its
adoption.
But what happens if the utilization patterns of the resources are
in transition, as is typical for emerging natural resources? By defini-
tion, emerging natural resources are harnessed by recently
developed and still-evolving technologies. This state of flux, cou-
pled with uncertainties concerning the effects—both intended and
unintended—that commonly plague new technologies,13 makes it
impossible to conclusively establish the resource characteristics that
would otherwise form the factual basis for the normatively optimal
combination of ownership and control mechanisms. How should
one approach the issue of property rights under such uncertainty?
This Article examines the optimal design of property rights for
emerging natural resources via a case study on how weather-modifi-
cation activities are regulated among the fifty states. Given the
profound effects of weather on human subsistence and human ac-
tivity, attempts to influence the weather are virtually universal
across human culture, ranging from the fascinating diversity of tri-
bal ritual to the intriguing experiments of early industrial-age
pseudoscience.14 As technological advancements have at once in-
creased our surveillance of weather patterns and enhanced our
capacity to alter the physical environment, the harnessing of atmos-
pheric moisture—the natural resource primarily targeted by
weather-modification technologies—has finally begun moving from
ritual to reality.15
11. See Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 1091, 1109–10 (2011); Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 479–92 (2010); Heller, supra note 9, at 659.
12. Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 421,
433 (2002); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Prop-
erty, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 123–25 (2005).
13. See, e.g., Marc Allen Eisner, Institutional Evolution or Intelligent Design: Constructing a
Regulatory Regime for Nanotechnology, in GOVERNING UNCERTAINTY: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
IN THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 28, 29–42 (Christopher J. Bosso ed., 2010) (na-
notechnology); Wolfgang van den Daele, Legal Framework and Political Strategy in Dealing with
the Risks of New Technology: the Two Faces of the Precautionary Principle, in THE REGULATORY CHAL-
LENGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 118, 118–20 (Han Somsen ed., 2007) (genetic modified
organisms).
14. WILLIAM R. COTTON & ROGER A. PIELKE SR., HUMAN IMPACTS ON WEATHER AND CLI-
MATE 3 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 2007); Ray Jay Davis, Atmospheric Water Resources
Development and International Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 11, 11–12 (1991); Joel P. Bartlett,
Environmental and Legal Considerations in Weather Modification Activities in the Northern Sierra
Nevada, 12 WATER, AIR, AND SOIL POLLUTION 29, 29 (1979).
15. Some of the most important technologies include satellite and radar meteorological
tracking and computerized analysis of weather data. Harold D. Orville, Weather Modification,
in HANDBOOK OF WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND WATER: DYNAMICS, CLIMATE, PHYSICAL METEOROL-
OGY, WEATHER SYSTEMS, AND MEASUREMENTS 433, 444–47 (Thomas D. Potter & Bradley R.
Colman eds., 2003); Chunglin Kwa, The Rise and Fall of Weather Modification, in CHANGING THE
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It has been a long process. Concerted attempts at weather modi-
fication began shortly after World War II. For the most part, the
United States led the way, on both the public and the private fronts,
as large-scale, government-sponsored cloud-study programs ap-
peared at the same time as early corporate attempts at viable
commercial cloud-seeding.16 Since the 1950s, there have been nu-
merous legislative and regulatory responses (at both state and
federal levels) and a handful of judicial decisions,17 some of which
led to explicit legal pronouncements on the property rights to at-
mospheric moisture.18
Drawing on this relatively detailed legislative and regulatory ex-
perience, which has been quite lengthy in comparison to other
modern emerging natural resources, this case study explores the
relationship between the allocation of property rights—whether
legislatively instituted or judicially declared—and the correspond-
ing regulatory controls on weather-modification activities. The case
study makes two notable findings. First, states differ widely in their
regulatory approaches, and no dominant approach has emerged.
This situation, hardly unexpected, reflects the particular challenges
posed by emerging natural resources. Without a consensus about
the actual consequences of the regulated activities, it is only natural
to expect a high degree of regulatory experimentation among the
states, particularly in the absence of overarching federal law or
regulation.19
Second, and more surprisingly, the express declaration of state
ownership of—or sovereign rights over20—atmospheric moisture in
ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 135, 143 (Clark A. Miller
& Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001).
16. COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 67–72; CHARLES F. HUTCHINSON & STEPHANIE M.
HERRMANN, THE FUTURE OF ARID LANDS—REVISITED 47–48 (2008); Kwa, supra note 15, at 138.
For a good historical account on the development of weather modification, see James R.
Fleming, The Pathological History of Weather and Climate Modification: Three Cycles of Promise and
Hype, 37 HIST. STUD. PHYSICAL & BIOLOGICAL SCI. 3 (2006).
17. Infra Part IV.A.
18. Infra Part IV.B.
19. Infra Part IV.A.1.
20. In the scholarly literature, state sovereign rights over a resource are often equated or
used interchangeably with state ownership, as the establishment of state sovereign rights will
grant the state exclusive control over the resource and preclude the possibility of private
ownership (save for licenses or other state-granted permission). See, e.g., Deepa Varadarajan,
A Trade Secret Approach to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 371, 388–89
(2011); ELENA MERINO BLANCO & JONA RAZZAQUE, GLOBALIZATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW: CHALLENGES, KEY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 9 (Edward Elgar 2011); TERENCE DAINTITH,
FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 305–06
(2010); Carole Nakhle, Iraq’s Oil: Dangers and Rewards, 8 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY L. REV. 263,
264 (2010); Yinka Omorogbe & Peter Oniemola, Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial
Regimes, in PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 115, 120–24 (Aileen
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a state’s statute or constitution has no observable effects on that
state’s regulatory regime. Contrary to the views of some scholars
that nationalization invariably leads to heavier state intervention
and larger claims to the economic surplus,21 state ownership has
not resulted in either greater regulatory control or more redistribu-
tion than that in states that have not laid claim to atmospheric
moisture.22 By contrast, judicial decisions granting private rights
over atmospheric moisture have had a constraining effect on the
regulatory regime, as seen in the unique regulatory provisions of
those states.23
Building on these findings, this case study highlights an unduly
neglected dimension of the design of property rights: the relative
ease of future transitions, whether on the ownership plane or on
the regulatory one. Although no scholar would ever claim that re-
source-utilization patterns are static (given the numerous scholarly
studies of how and why property rights evolve24), discussions about
optimal property rights have consistently focused on the compati-
bility of rights with current patterns of resource utilization, while
McHarg et al. eds., 2010). See also Dale D. Globe, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the
Public Trust and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 838–39, 847–53 (2005) (discussing how
the courts’ confusing/inconsistent categorization of state’s power to regulate wildlife as
“property” and “sovereignty” is due a semantic issue where “ownership” is “simply a short-
hand way of describing a State’s substantial interest in preserving and regulating . . . the fish
and game.”). C.f., Ricardo Pereira & Orla Gough, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
in the 21st Century: Natural Resource Governance and the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous
Peoples under International Law, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 451, 455 n.17 (2013) (“As regards offshore
energy resources, coastal states have ‘sovereign rights’ in the continental shelf and functional
jurisdiction for purposes of exploring and exploiting, but not ownership rights.”); Jonnette
Watson Hamilton & Nigel Bankes, Different Views of the Cathedral: The Literature on Property Law
Theory, in PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, supra, at 19, 30–31
(discussing the under-theorized connection between sovereignty and property, where there
are scholars who equate sovereignty as property, while others see property as following from
sovereignty). In the weather modification statutes surveyed, the state’s rights to the atmos-
pheric moisture were usually declared via sovereign rights, though North Dakota labelled the
provision “extended state ownership of water sovereignty over moisture” while Montana de-
clared “atmospheric waters” as “the property of the state.” Infra Part IV.B.
21. Gabriela Engler Pinto, Upstream Oil and Gas Legal Frameworks: Brazil and the United
States Compared, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 975, 997–98 (2013); A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, The Issue of
Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas Industry, 15
TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 79, 83-85 (2010). See Chen & Cui, supra note 4, at 91–92
(discussing the public skepticisms over the purported “nationalization” of wind and sunlight
by a Chinese provincial government).
22. Infra Part IV.C.
23. Infra Part IV.C.
24. E.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
354–59 (1967); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Ac-
cess Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 77, 86–90 (2009); Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and
Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J 996,
1038–46 (2006); Wyman, supra note 12, at 123–25; Levmore, supra note 12, at 433; Barry C.
Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319, 335–40 (1989).
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neglecting to consider the effects of different initial allocations on
future transitions. In one sense, this omission is understandable,
given the relatively stable resource-utilization patterns of conven-
tional natural resources. But in the emerging resources context,
current uncertainties make future changes almost inevitable. For
that reason, any analysis of the optimal allocation of property rights
should consider whether that allocation will impede or facilitate the
changes that will become normatively desirable as technologies ma-
ture and uncertainties are resolved.
Specifically, this Article argues that state ownership—the increas-
ingly neglected child in the property literature25—can actually be
desirable, because it facilitates future transitions. First, transition to
the different property rights regime (the commons, private prop-
erty, or the anticommons26) and control mechanisms (e.g.,
regulations and taxes) is easier—both legally and politically—when
the starting point is state ownership. Second, there is greater
chance of a holistic assessment and alignment of property owner-
ship and control mechanisms during a transition from state
ownership than from another property rights regime. While it is
true that numerous legitimate concerns may be raised about the
efficiency and fairness of state ownership,27 state property nonethe-
less merits greater scholarly attention, particularly when the
resource is an emerging natural resource and when the state has
well-functioning governance institutions.
There is a broader point to be made here. This case study of
atmospheric moisture, like previous comparative studies of state
property across other jurisdictions,28 shows that continuous and ac-
tive intervention by government regulators is but one of many
approaches that a state may adopt to manage state property. Once
stripped of its undeserved association with socialism, state property
has an important role to play in the general property rights
literature.
This Article is organized into five Parts. Part I engages in a litera-
ture review to highlight the unexamined issue of the comparative
25. E.g., Michael Heller, Introduction: Commons and Anticommons Reader, in COMMONS AND
ANTICOMMONS: VOLUME I xi, xvi (Michael Heller ed., 2009); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 71 (1989). State property has been more favorably discussed in the
context of emerging natural resources. See, e.g., Spranking, supra note 2, at 1032–33 (arguing
that the mantle, outer core, and inner core should be considered as public land owned by
the federal government).
26. See Heller, supra note 25, at xviii (describing commons, private property and an-
ticommons as the “full spectrum of ownership”).
27. See infra Part V.C.
28. E.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J.
991, 994 (2014); Chen & Cui, supra note 4, at 111–19.
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ease of transition out of different property rights arrangements.
Part II lays out the overall context of the case study: it first outlines
the historical development and current status of weather-modifica-
tion activities, then surveys the existing scholarly literature on the
ownership of atmospheric moisture. Part III presents the findings
of this case study, notes the diverse array of regulatory approaches
in the fifty states, and examines the relationship between property
rights assignments and regulatory regimes. Part IV addresses the in-
different regulatory effect of state ownership and explains how state
ownership facilitates easier and more holistic transitions, and thus
how state ownership may be a desirable property rights arrange-
ment for emerging natural resources under certain specified
conditions. Part V discusses the broader implications of the unde-
servedly chastised and/or neglected idea of state property
ownership within the property rights literature.
I. OPTIMAL PROPERTY
This Part briefly surveys the burgeoning literature on the design
of property rights for optimal resource utilization. In four Sections,
it examines the classic literature of commons and anti-commons;
the role of resource characteristics and control mechanisms on the
desirability of the outcome; the existing discussion of transitions;
and, finally, how emerging natural resources highlight the previ-
ously unexamined issue of relative ease of transition.
A. Commons and Anticommons
The concepts of commons and anticommons are now indispen-
sable for almost any discussion of optimal property rights over a
given resource.29 The concept of commons30 took off with Garrett
Hardin’s seminal “The Tragedy of the Commons.”31 Hardin,
through the example of a public-access pasture, examined the po-
tential pitfalls of resources that are subject to communal ownership.
Hardin’s central insight is elegantly simple: because any individual
29. See Lee Ann Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 907, 907–09 (2004)
(giving a concise intellectual history on the rise and entrenchment of the two concepts in
legal discourse).
30. The concept of the commons, and the recognition that such resources are suscepti-
ble to overexploitation, predates Hardin’s article. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic
Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
31. Hardin, supra note 8.
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herdsman will retain all the benefits of grazing his herd on the pas-
ture but bear only a fraction of the costs of overgrazing, the pasture
will almost inevitably be overexploited, and will collapse.32 The ca-
nonical contemporaneous example of such a dynamic is overfishing
in international waters.  Depletion of fish stocks and the collapse of
major international fisheries remain significant challenges today.33
But, as the following section I.B. will discuss, the fact that a re-
source is communally owned does not necessarily imply that it will
be used inefficiently. Nonetheless, the stark prospect of unre-
strained multi-party exploitation prompted many scholars to
prescribe privatization as a virtual panacea to the problem of over-
exploitation.34 Through the parceling out and creation of private
property in the underlying resource, each owner will now arguably
have incentive to conserve the resource for optimal utilization.
In certain situations, however, privatization can be suboptimal, a
point Michael Heller recognized in a pioneering article that
launched the concept of the anticommons.35 Anticommons, as its
name suggests, is the polar opposite of the commons: it consists of
resources over which multiple entities hold rights of exclusion. Given
the frequently high transaction costs necessary for effective coordi-
nation among these multiple rights holders, as well as the invariable
holdout problems, resource underuse is the bane of such an ar-
rangement of property rights. Heller’s lead example, the
fragmented regulatory regimes of post-Soviet Russia storefronts,
showed how the anticommons could lead to as many “tragic” out-
comes as does Hardin’s commons.36 Later scholars, applying and
extending Heller’s insights, have brought the anticommons to bear
32. Id. at 1244.
33. Winter, supra note 8, at 137; Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the
Public Trust Doctrine: Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7–11 (2007); Fikret Berkes,
Native Subsistence Fisheries: A Synthesis of Harvest Studies in Canada, 43 ARCTIC 35, 40–41 (1990);
O. Hertz & F. O. Kapel, Commercial and Subsistence Hunting of Marine Mammals, 15 AMBIO 144,
146 (1986).
34. See Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution,
78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 537–38 (2007) (discussing the popularity of privatization as the
solution for environmental problems among academics and policymakers since the 1970s);
Dagan & Heller, supra note 10, at 559–64 (discussing how the tragedy of the commons is
commonly used in the literature as a theoretical justification for private property). See also
Thra´inn Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION,
CONFLICT AND LAW 73, 75–84 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2002) (arguing
for a more nuanced distinction between open-access and common property).
35. Heller, supra note 9, at 624–26.
36. Id. at 627–59.
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on the issues of intellectual property (patents in particular37) and
post-disaster reconstruction.38
B. Comedy and Tragedy
Commons and anticommons are associated with the tragedies of
overexploitation and underutilization, usually (but not always39) in
that order. Yet an adverse outcome is not a necessary consequence
of adopting either regime. Scholars have identified two scenarios in
particular in which commons and anticommons may be desirable.
The first is when the optimal use of a resource is the over- or
under-use characteristic of commons and anticommons, respec-
tively. For example, creating an anticommons in land that should
be conserved—perhaps by granting veto powers to multiple enti-
ties—turns the supposed disadvantage of high transaction costs into
a desirable damper on development.40 Conversely, the public access
facilitated by the commons can generate large social and economic
benefits when the property in question is crucial to commerce and
serves as a socializing network.41 From a broader perspective, these
examples are simply manifestations of the commonsense principle
that the optimal property rights arrangement will depend upon the
particular characteristics of the natural resource involved.42
37. E.g., Murray & Stern, supra note 9; Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Frag-
mented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE 804 (2004).
38. E.g., Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A
Public Choice Analysis, 127 PUB. CHOICE 55 (2006); Mark D. West & Emily M. Morris, The
Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal Responses to Collective Action Problems After the Kobe Earthquake,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903 (2003).
39. Commons will not be overused but underused if harvesting/capturing of the re-
sources from the commons does not provide any right of exclusion to the harvester/
capturer. Anticommons might be overused if the rights of veto are sufficiently costly and the
collective action problem of free riders results in insufficient exercise of those veto rights.
Heller, supra note 9, at 675–78. See Fennell, supra note 29, at 933–40 (arguing that the dichot-
omy of overuse and underuse is illusionary given the fluidity in framing the resource in
question).
40. Heller, supra note 25, at xxiv; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and
Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31–36 (2003).
41. Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and the Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 774–81 (1986).
42. Rule, supra note 3, at 804–05; DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPAR-
ING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 130–32 (2002). E.g., Amy R.
Poteete & David Welch, Institutional Development in the Face of Complexity: Developing Rules for
Managing Forest Resources, 32 HUM. ECOLOGY 279 (2004) (discussing how management of dif-
ferent forest resources is affected by the various characteristics of identification risk,
resilience, scarcity and abundance, variability and predictability, the viability of storage, and
the availability of substitute); Eggertsson, supra note 34, at 75 (“The efficiency of property
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The second scenario arises where the commons or anticommons
is accompanied by control mechanisms that mitigate the core
problems of externalities and transaction costs. For example, the
community that has access to the commons might develop customs
and norms covering resource use that can be efficient alternatives
to centralized regulations or privatization.43 The breakdown of such
an informal governance structure, whether due to socioeconomic
changes altering social dynamics44 or failed replacement with for-
mal regulation45, will be detrimental to the resource utilization.46
On the theoretical front, Hanoch Dagan and Michael A. Heller
have proposed a concept of the “liberal commons.” Through con-
trol mechanisms, the liberal commons seeks to maximize efficiency
and optimize the redistribution of resources owned by multiple par-
ties. The individual control mechanisms deployed, such as
restrictions on overuse, procedural safeguards on collective deci-
sion-making, and right of first refusal over exit, are designed to
secure three core values: individual dominion, democratic self-gov-
ernance, and cooperation-enhancing exit.47 In the same vein, the
anticommons’s holdout problem may be mitigated by informal
management mechanisms that encourage cooperation and foster
other communitarian values among the rights holders.48
Again, the above simply reflects the general principle that the
strengths of any particular proposed property rights arrangement
can be undermined (and its weaknesses mitigated) by control
mechanisms governing use of the property. For example, private
rights arrangements is situation-specific. . . . [P]roperty rights are costly to institute and oper-
ate (enforce), and the costs depend on relative prices, available technologies, physical
characteristics of the assets, types of uses, and the general setting (the institutional
environment).”).
43. OSTROM, supra note 10, at 15–21. See Kettles, supra note 10, at 77–92 (arguing—vis-a`-
vis a field study about the allocation of sidewalk in Los Angeles—that the informal allocation
system used by illegal vendors (“first come, first served” rule supplemented by the possibility
of established rights through continuous usage) is superior than the formal allocation system
for legal vendors administered by the a government-contracted non-profit organization (in-
cluding lottery and assignment on account of benefits of vendor and surrounding
neighborhood)).
44. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 1033–37 (discussing how social norms governing
resource management may break down due to rise in resource value, influx of outsiders that
cannot be excluded, and imposition of competing state governance mechanisms); Shirli
Kopelman, J. Mark Weber & David M. Messick, Factors Influencing Cooperation in Commons Di-
lemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 113,
118–44 (Elinor Ostrom ed., 2002) (discussing the various factors affecting cooperation, in-
cluding culture, group size and heterogeneity, payoff structure).
45. Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 1011–12; Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the
Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 493, 495 (1999).
46. Eggertsson, supra note 34, at 84–85.
47. Dagan & Heller, supra note 10, at 581–602.
48. Heller, supra note 9, at 674.
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property is valued for giving the owner the incentive and accompa-
nying freedom to choose the most appropriate form of resource
use.49 But various forms of formal legislative, regulatory, and judi-
cial control,50 or informal customs and norms,51 can curtail the
freedom and distort the choice. Conversely, the potential problems
of externalities and redistribution arising from privatization can
also be mitigated by control mechanisms. On a more basic level,
Henry E. Smith explained that property rights could be viewed as
falling along a spectrum between the poles of “exclusion” (repre-
senting the conventional understanding of demarcating property
boundaries) and “governance” (representing controls over uses).52
The “property proper” combines both elements (e.g., the ad coelum
rule coupled with nuisance, zoning and neighborhood cove-
nants),53 and the optimal combination depends upon the cost-
effectiveness of the respective proxies: one weighs the relative value
of achieving informational precision in view of the associated mea-
suring costs, for both demarcating boundaries (exclusion) and
restricting use (governance).54
49. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2081–89 (2012);
Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak, Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free
Access Under the General Mining Law of 1872, 34 ENVTL. L. 745, 764–73 (2004).
50. The common law doctrine of nuisance is the most prominent example of judicial
control over activities that are deemed to cause a substantial and unreasonable interference
with a claimant’s land or with a claimant’s use of that land. JOHN MURPHY, THE LAW OF NUI-
SANCE 5–7(2010); Bent Ole Gram Mortensen et al., Environmental Protection Law, in LEGAL
SYSTEMS AND WIND ENERGY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 207, 223 (Helle Tegner Anker,
Birgitte Egelund Olsen & Anita Rønne eds., 2008). There is a similar concept of neighbor law
in civil law. Helle Tegner Anker, Birgitte Egelund Olsen & Anita Rønne, Wind Energy and the
Law: A Comparative Analysis, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 145, 159 (2009).
51. Sinden, supra note 34, at 548; OSTROM, supra note 10, at 15–21.
52. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 454–56 (2002). For recent application of this perspective, see
Lynda L. Butler, The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1687,
1757–67 (2015) (arguing that physical takings should be judicially assessed from both the
exclusion and governance strategy perspective); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95
B.U. L. REV. 155, 182–85 (2015) (discussing the exclusion and governance rules in relation
to low altitude airspace); Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853,
1860–63 (2012) (observing the proliferation of property where governance, rather than ex-
clusion, is the dominant mode of property ownership).
53. Smith, supra note 52, at 456.
54. Id. at 468–74; see also COLE, supra note 42, at 8–18 (criticizing the conceptual dichot-
omy between property regime and regulation, and arguing that all solutions to the tragedy of
open access are essentially property-based).
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C. Transition and Inertia
The previous Section explained that whether a natural resource’s
use will be optimal depends upon the compatibility of the form of
property ownership, the characteristics of resource utilization, and
the accompanying control mechanisms. Implicit in this understand-
ing is that the optimal combination of property ownership and
control mechanisms will change when resource-use patterns alter,
whether because of technological advances or socioeconomic
changes. Commons with negligible control mechanisms is actually
an ideal management strategy for fisheries when population density
is low and fishing technology is primitive. The switch from com-
mons to private property and/or the introduction of control
mechanisms only becomes necessary and desirable when the in-
creased harvesting induced by greater demand from a larger
population and facilitated by more efficient fishing methods sur-
passes the natural rate of reproduction.55
The question concerning whether and how such transitions ma-
terialize has been the subject of extended theoretical discussion
and much empirical investigation. The starting point is Harold
Demsetz’s claim that private property rights arise when internaliza-
tion of externalities becomes efficient (usually due to a
combination of an increase in the value of the resource and a de-
crease in the costs of establishing and enforcing the associated
rights),56 and his associated account of how the manifested form of
ownership depends upon factors such as economies of scale, negoti-
ating costs, and the characteristics of externalities.57 Later scholars
have enriched Demsetz’s account by adducing additional factors
that might affect the efficiency of the various possible property
rights arrangements, as well as refining the factors introduced by
Demsetz.58
This optimistic picture, in which efficiency is the main force driv-
ing transitions, has been challenged in part by Saul Levmore. In
Levmore’s more pessimistic view, transitions might equally well be
driven by interest groups battling for greater redistribution to
55. See Winter, supra note 8, at 137; Babcock, supra note 33, at 7–11; Berkes, supra note
33, at 40–41; Hertz & Kapel, supra note 33, at 146.
56. Demsetz, supra note 24, at 350–53.
57. Id. at 354–59.
58. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 24, at 86–90 (arguing that the size and
scope of the right are dimensions that should be included for a more complete account);
Field, supra note 24, at 335–40 (discussing the implication of governance costs); James Gra-
ham Lake, Demsetz Underground: Busking Regulation and the Formation of Property Rights, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1131–32 (2012) (discussing the role of exogenous legal constraints, such
as the First Amendment protection of speech and laws prohibiting physical violence).
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themselves.59 Given the size, governing scope, and practical capabil-
ities of the modern state, interest-group politics are likely to play at
least some role in any present-day transition.60 At the very least, the
presence of significant interest-group dynamics is likely to increase
the transaction costs of transition.
Another closely-related issue is the problem of inertia. Once cre-
ated, a given arrangement of property rights is likely to persist, for
numerous mutually reinforcing reasons. Entitlement holders,
moved by both material interests and cognitive bias, are likely to
resist attempts to weaken or abrogate their existing rights.61 When
the transitions involve concentrated losses to a minority (which is
typically the case with transitions away from private property and
anticommons) the political resistance is aggravated by interest-
group dynamics.62 Constitutional protection of property, particu-
larly when coupled with an expansive doctrine of regulatory
takings, will also impede attempts to modify existing private prop-
erty rights.63 On top of this is the general problem of regulatory
inertia: regulators often prove unwilling to change or relax rules
even when changes in circumstances have rendered those rules
inefficient.64 Thus, institutions created or reassigned to enforce the
new property rights arrangement will also tend to resist any changes
to the arrangement.65
59. Levmore, supra note 12, at 423–33.
60. Id.; Wyman, supra note 12, at 123–25; see Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency
Versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673,
731–38 (2007) (arguing that the public choice story provides a better explanation in the
context of road traffic management, especially in light of how the state is now the primary
provider of transportation network); see also Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Re-
gimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 365–70 (2002) (observing how a powerful oligarchy—for
example, colonial governments—can overcome the obstacles of collective action and miti-
gate transition costs when they initiate rearrangement of property rights to advance their
interests).
61. See Doremus, supra note 11, at 1099; Nash & Stern, supra note 11, at 479–92.
62. Doremus, supra note 11, at 1109; see Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 226–28 (2012) (highlighting the danger of rent-seeking by
well-organized narrow interest groups over the collective actions problem of the general
public).
63. Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 887–89 (2013);
Doremus, supra note 11, at 1100–01.
64. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 52, at 198; Ji Lian Yap, Amending the Statutory Framework for
the Registration of Company Charges, 35 STATUTE L. REV. 261, 277 (2014); Lake, supra note 58, at
1133–34; William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a
Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 123 (1995).
65. Heller, supra note 9, at 659.
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D. Emerging Natural Resources and the
Unresolved Relative Ease of Transition
There is one key topic that scholars have not touched on in their
discussions: the relative difficulty of transitions—both from one
property rights regime to another and from one regulatory regime
to another. It is true that various scholars have identified transi-
tional inertia marking a wide variety of property rights
arrangements, from private property66 to anticommons67 and com-
mons,68 and even to private claims on state property.69 To date,
however, no one has done a comparison across property rights ar-
rangements to determine which property rights arrangements are
particularly “sticky”—and hence more likely to be inefficiently out-
dated amid changing circumstances—and which are not.
This omission is understandable; the key concern of the litera-
ture is to lay down the optimal property rights arrangement right
from the outset. Given that the resource-utilization patterns of con-
ventional natural resources tend to be relatively stable without
radical changes in the foreseeable near future, it is simply unneces-
sary to consider the speculative prospect of future transition when
designing the appropriate arrangement of property rights. Thus,
the role of transition inertia in the literature is limited largely to
either explaining the persistence of inefficient property rights or
raising the stakes of the initial property rights arrangement without
necessarily implicating the actual choice.
66. See Rule, supra note 52, at 197–201 (arguing that creating low-altitude-airspace rights
for property owners would place “distinct and appropriate limits” on federal regulatory juris-
diction, which, due to regulatory inertia, is unlikely to adapt effectively to the emerging
proliferation of drone technology); Butler, supra note 63, at 888–89 (discussing how ex-
tending the Takings Clause to regulations provides property owners with both a legal avenue
for redress and a focal point for political mobilization); Erika Weinthal & Pauline Jones
Luong, Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth, 4
PERSP. ON POL. 35, 42–46 (2006) (arguing that domestic private ownership counteracts the
inherent and inevitable governance deficiencies in resource-rich developing countries).
67. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 9, at 659 (“Once anticommons property is created, mar-
kets or governments may have difficulty in assembling rights into usable bundles. After initial
entitlements are set, institutions and interests coalesce around them, with the result that the
path to private property may be blocked and scarce resources may be wasted.”).
68. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 1010–21 (discussing the persistence, albeit im-
perfect, of customary rights of the local community over common resources in developing
countries in the face of formal attempts by the state to reassign property rights).
69. Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991,
1033 (2014) (discussing how the popular notion that public access is integral to publicly
owned property has contributed to the durability of private claims to public property even
where the private claims are by no means legally guaranteed or do not amount to property
rights).
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With emerging natural resources, however, the issue of future
transition is quite salient. By definition, uncertainty about the fu-
ture use patterns of such resources precludes, for the present, any
definitive conclusions about the optimal property rights arrange-
ment. Because changes in the resource-utilization pattern are
eminently foreseeable, it seems almost negligent to design property
rights for emerging natural resources without considering how the
initial arrangement might unduly impede transitions in the near
future. Similarly, one might posit that, all else being equal, a prop-
erty rights arrangement that facilitates an easier or normatively
superior70 transition would be preferable to a “stickier” arrange-
ment of property rights.
The remainder of this Article represents a first take on this issue
of transition through a case study on atmospheric moisture. Atmos-
pheric moisture provides a useful case study for assessing the design
of property rights in emerging natural resources because it is one of
the first modern emerging natural resources and has a legislative
and regulatory history  now over half a century in the making. Al-
though it is true that all current conventional natural resources
were once emerging natural resources, the evolution of property
rights over them tends to have stabilized before the rise of the mod-
ern regulatory state. Without incorporating the effect and
operation of the modern regulatory state,71 the relevance of the in-
quiry to the current debate on contemporaneous emerging natural
resources would be considerably diminished. Indeed, as discussed
in Part III, infra, the management of atmospheric moisture usage is
primarily via regulatory controls. Only occasionally do explicitly de-
fined property rights over atmospheric moisture supplement such
controls.
70. Space constraints prevent a comprehensive examination concerning what consti-
tutes a normatively superior transition. However, this Article utilizes the case study to argue
that a holistic transition involving simultaneous changes to both a property rights arrange-
ment and a control mechanism that is normatively superior to reactionary transitions in
which attempted modifications to resource utilizations must occur on the basis of that one
dimension—usually the property rights dimension—is going to remain unchanged. Infra
Part V.B.
71. For discussion about the advent of the modern regulatory state, see Jason M. Solo-
mon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 821–37
(2008); Craig Bradley, The Rule of Law in an Unruly Age, 71 IND. L.J. 949 (1996); John Kay et
al., Regulatory Reform in Britain, 3 ECON. POL’Y 285, 289–301 (1988).
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II. WEATHER MODIFICATION IN CONTEXT
This Part sets out the basic context for the case study in Part III,
infra, by discussing the historical evolution and present status of
weather-modification technologies, and then examining the ex-
isting legal discussions of the subject.
A. Background
Human culture is inextricably intertwined with the weather. Civi-
lizations rise and fall with the blessing or curse brought by ever-
changing precipitation, temperature, and other climatic ele-
ments.72 Across the globe, the multitude of elaborate ceremonies
dedicated to affecting the weather demonstrate both the rich cul-
tural diversity of premodern human societies and the common
yearning for influence over the seemingly indomitable and incom-
prehensible skies.73 The advent of the Industrial Age saw many
attempts to deploy the latest mechanical inventions (rockets, can-
nons, etc.) in service of weather modification74 but did little to
move beyond pseudo-science.
Only after World War II did real progress begin, as a result of
both technological advance and socio-political change. Scientists’
understanding of weather dynamics grew significantly, thanks to
the availability of precise meteorological data from satellites and ra-
dars—data now analyzed almost exclusively by computers.75 The
refinement of aviation technologies also increased our access to the
skies and clouds.76 Similarly, the threat and offensive potential of
modified weather in achieving Cold War military objectives, in con-
junction with the widespread optimism concerning the future
prospect of human dominion over climate, helped spawn large-
scale U.S government-sponsored research programs on weather
72. See generally PATRICK D. NUNN, CLIMATE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC
DURING THE LAST MILLENNIUM (2007); ARIE S. ISSAR & MATTANYAH ZOHAR, CLIMATE CHANGE:
ENVIRONMENT AND CIVILIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2004).
73. For some interesting account on the ritualistic practices around the world, see Maria
H. Schoeman, Imagining Rain-Places: Rain-Control and Changing Ritual Landscapes in the Shashe-
Limpopo Confluence Area, South Africa, 61 S. AFR. ARCHAEOLOGICAL BULL. 152, 161–64 (2006);
Margaret Cannell, Signs, Omens, and Portents in Nebraska Folklore, 13 U. NEB. STUD. LANGUAGE,
LITERATURE, & CRITICISM 1, 10–11 (1933).
74. COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 3; Davis, supra note 14, at 11–12.
75. Orville, supra note 15, at 444–47; Kwa, supra note 15, at 143.
76. Don A. Griffith, Cloud Seeding Modes, Instrumentation, and Status of Precipitation En-
hancement Technology, in GUIDELINES FOR CLOUD SEEDING TO AUGMENT PRECIPITATION 81,
81–103 (Conrad G. Keyes Jr. et al. eds., 2006); see Orville, supra note 15, at 437.
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modification, alongside ample experimentation by private cloud-
seeding enterprises.77
Notwithstanding the limited advances in the theoretical under-
standing and practical operation of weather modification,78 the
scale and distribution of weather-modification operations has only
continued to grow.79 Countries as diverse as China, South Africa,
Libya, Morocco, Burkina Faso, India, and Australia currently oper-
ate government-sponsored weather-modification programs, as do a
handful of U.S. states (Utah and Colorado, for instance).80 Com-
mercial weather-modification operators proudly claim operations
in even more jurisdictions.81 One reason for such proliferation is
the potential payoff. The marginal benefit of any additional precipi-
tation, although discounted due to an uncertain causal
relationship, is arguably substantial enough (particularly in arid ar-
eas) to justify the often high costs of weather modification.82
77. COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 67–72; Fleming, supra note 16; Kwa, supra note
15, at 137–38.
78. See ANDREW S. GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IMPACT ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 226–27 (6th ed. 2009); Tarek Majzoub et al., “Cloud Busters”: Reflections
on the Right to Water in Clouds and a Search for International Law Rules, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 321, 341–43 (2009); HUTCHINSON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 54; Kwa, supra
note 15, at 162.
79. In the U.S. at least, commentators have observed how weather modification opera-
tions continued to expand despite a decrease in government funding for weather
modification research, prompting a commentator to opine that “we have entered the ‘dark
ages’ of weather modification where operational cloud seeding projects are, if anything, pro-
liferating without a sound scientific research program supporting them.” William R. Cotton,
Weather Modification by Cloud Seeding—A Status Report 1989–1997, in ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE
CHANGE 139, 153 (Hans von Storch & Go¨tz Flo¨ser eds. 1999); THEODORE STEINBERG, SLIDE
MOUNTAIN, OR, THE FOLLY OF OWNING NATURE 107–09 (1995); see also Kwa, supra note 15, at
157 (discussing how federal funding for weather modification in the U.S. have substantially
decreased since peaking in the 1960s); Virginia Simms, Making the Rain: Cloud Seeding, the
Imminent Freshwater Crisis, and International Law, 44 INT’L L. 915, 928 (2010) (discussing the
operations of private weather modification companies).
80. HUTCHINSON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 55. For a brief outline of the weather
modification programs in selected countries, see Simms, supra note 79, at 922–28; cf. Kwa,
supra note 15, at 157–64 (tracing the decline in state and public support for weather modifi-
cation in the U.S. since the late 1960s and attributing the decline to—aside for the overstated
scientific claims and the continued uncertainties of the technologies—the increased public
awareness concerning the unintended effects to the overall climate that may results from
human intervention).
81. See, e.g., Clients & Projects, WEATHER MODIFICATION INC., http://weathermodifica-
tion.com/projects.php (last visited Sept. 29, 2016) (listing clients in 19 countries: Antigua,
Argentina, Australia, Burkina Faso, Canada, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordon, Mali, Mexico,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, U.A.E., and U.S). See also Weather
Eng’g Corp. of Am. v. United States, 614 F.2d 281, 285 (1980) (discussing the commercial
history of a Canadian weather modification company—Weather Engineering Corporation of
Canada Ltd—which included engagement in Iran and Cyprus and inquiries by governments
of India and the People’s Republic of China in the 1960s and 1970s).
82. HUTCHINSON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 55; Cotton, supra note 79, at 158; see
Bartlett, supra note 14, at 32 (noting that a one-to-ten cost benefit ratio is “not uncommon”).
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Political considerations are also undoubtedly a factor. Governments
stand to benefit if they are perceived by their citizenry as actively
attempting to alleviate some of the populace’s most salient hard-
ships, such as lack of adequate rain.83
B. Types of Weather Modification and Their Basic Mechanics
The most prominent type of weather modification—and the pri-
mary focus of this Article—is cloud seeding, a technology for
inducing precipitation. Increased rainfall is highly beneficial to ar-
eas suffering from drought, as well as permanently arid areas. But
alleviating dry conditions is by no means the only end to which the
technology has been put. During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, for
example, China conducted large-scale cloud-seeding operations to
dissipate potential rain clouds before they could reach the vicinity
of the main sporting venues.84 Other cloud-seeding operations have
attempted to reduce the strength of hurricanes85 and suppress
hail.86
Cloud-seeding involves dispersing a batch of certain chemicals
(the “seeding agents”) into a cloud in order to transform the
cloud’s structure into one more likely to release precipitation in the
form of rain or snow. Although the exact science underpinning
weather modification remains in flux, the practice is well-defined.
In sum,87 cold-based continental clouds are seeded with glaciogenic
Increased rain may also increase the amount of hydropower generated and reduces the cost
of electricity. See Larry R. Dozier, Colorado River Augmentation, 37 TRENDS 1, 14 (2006). For a
general discussion on the various studies evaluating the economic efficacy of weather modifi-
cation operations, see Conrad G. Keyes, Jr., Societal, Environmental, and Economic Aspects of
Precipitation Enhancement by Cloud Seeding, in GUIDELINES FOR CLOUD SEEDING TO AUGMENT
PRECIPITATION 9, 25–36 (Conrad G. Keyes Jr. et al. eds., 2006).
83. Simms, supra note 79, at 915–16 (noting the political considerations of shifting
blame and strategic geo-political diplomacy that may explain Venezuelan cloud seeding mod-
ifications in 2009 to tackle severe drought); Cotton, supra note 79, at 158 (“Often the
decision to apply cloud seeding technology in a particular country or state is a prescription of
a political placebo or a decision that it is better to do something than to sit idly by and do
nothing as reservoirs dry up and crops wither and die due to the absence of water.”).
84. Can Humans Control Weather, US FED NEWS, May 15, 2009; Wang Xiuwei, Rengong
yingxiang tianqi quan jiexi [Analysis on Power of Weather Modification], 5 HEBEI L. SCI. 34, 34
(2008).
85. GOUDIE, supra note 78, at 228; COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 63–65.
86. GOUDIE, supra note 78, at 227–28; Orville, supra note 15, at 443–44; Kwa, supra note
15, at 149–50; STEINBERG, supra note 79, at 112.
87. For detailed exposition of the underlying scientific theories, see generally COTTON &
PIELKE, supra note 14, at 9–40; Robert Czys, Thomas P. DeFelice & Don A. Griffith, The Scien-
tific Basis, in GUIDELINES FOR CLOUD SEEDING TO AUGMENT PRECIPITATION, supra note 82, at
61–76; Orville, supra note 15, at 436–38.
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seeding agents, which triggers the formation of ice crystals from sus-
pended supercooled liquid water by introducing impurities into the
water; water can only remain in liquid form at sub-zero tempera-
tures when impurities are absent (hence the term “supercooled”).
Conversely, warm and maritime clouds are seeded with hygroscopic
seeding agents that, attract surrounding water vapor to form cloud
droplets and accelerate the formation of water droplets heavy
enough to fall from the cloud as rain. The appropriate seeding
agents and the optimal window for dispersal depend upon the
structure of the targeted cloud.88 Given the high altitudes at which
cloud-seeding chemicals must be dispersed, effective seeding most
often involves aerial disbursement, either via aircraft or through the
use of such instruments as rockets or anti-aircraft guns. Certain
clouds, such as orographic clouds (clouds formed by the forced lift-
ing of air by topographic features such as mountains), can be
seeded by generators placed on the ground.89
It is worth noting that weather modification can also be con-
ducted on a much larger, “macro” level, with the primary aim of
mitigating global climate changes. Known as geoengineering, the
proposed operations range from the relatively mundane (fertilizing
of the ocean to stimulate the growth of phytoplankton, which cap-
ture carbon dioxide through photosynthesis) to the grandiose
(proposals to place a “sunshade” in space, to reduce the amount of
solar radiation).90 The legal issues raised by such macro activities
are certainly fascinating.91 But the regulation of geoengineering, as
with all legal issues that are truly transnational in nature, runs up
against a fundamental problem: the lack of established efficacious
governing institutions.92 Although conventional weather-modifica-
tion may raise international environmental law issues in certain
88. For a relatively updated and detailed account on the various possible operational
mechanisms for cloud-seeding, see Griffith, supra note 76, at 81–104; Orville, supra note 15,
at 436–38.
89. Griffith, supra note 76, at 100–01; Orville, supra note 15, at 436–38.
90. Karen N. Scott, International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering
Challenge, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 309, 323, 329 (2013); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis-Ye-
laghotis, Geoengineering a Future for Humankind: Some Technical and Ethical Considerations, 2012
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 128, 129 (2012).
91. For discussions on the legal issues that might arise from geoengineering, see Edward
A. Parson & David W. Keith, End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research, 339
SCIENCE 1278, 1278 (2013); Joshua B. Horton, Andrew Parker & David Keith, Liability for Solar
Geoengineering: Historical Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance Possibilities, 22
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 225–27 (2015); Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 90, at 134–35.
92. See Scott, supra note 90, at 329–39; Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 90, at
134–36; cf. Horton, Parker & Keith, supra note 91, at 265–71 (proposing a liability regime for
solar geoengineering by drawing from existing international liability regimes).
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circumstances,93 its activities, as well as its benefits and costs, are
generally confined within the jurisdiction of one nation (or, in-
deed, of one state or province). Thus, the examination of weather
modification activities in this Article will leave aside geoengineering
and the unique legal issues it raises.
C. Previous Scholarship on the Ownership of Atmospheric Moisture
Weather modification offers great promise: generating weather
conditions highly beneficial to selected human activities and
human subsistence in certain climates. Even so, it is not without its
controversies. On top of the operational risks involved in weather-
modification activities94 and the possibly harmful environmental ef-
fects of certain seeding chemicals,95 weather modification raises a
number of important legal concerns: the diversion of rainwater to
the detriment of nearby land96 or competing conceptions of the
optimal weather to induce.97 Unsurprisingly, such externality and
redistribution problems have led to the standard calls for regulatory
intervention.98 But the property rights to atmospheric moisture
have also been a primary focus both of the literature and of
litigation.
The typical scale of weather modifications covers large tracts of
land and, in some instances, large swaths of the population. The
nature of property rights and personal autonomy mean that con-
sent—of landowners and of other individuals affected by weather
modifications—is always a potential issue, even when there is no
93. The issue is most salient for large scale weather modification activities near the bor-
ders of neighboring nations. Simms, supra note 79, at 930–35; Majzoub et al., supra note 78,
at 355–59.
94. See, e.g., Yang Hua & Xiao Baopin, Lun rengong yingxiang tianqi de falv jiuji ji
fayuan de zuoyong—yi fayuan canyu shehui guanli chuangxin wei shijiao [On the Legal Reme-
dies of Weather Modification and the Role of the Court: A perspective of Court’s Participation in Social
Innovation of Management], 2012 J. JIANGHAN U. (SOC. SCI. EDITION) 48, 48 (2012); Simms,
supra note 79, at 921.
95. Simms, supra note 79, at 921; see Bartlett, supra note 14, at 33–34 (acknowledging the
concern but arguing that the minute amount of chemical agents used meant that the health
effect is likely to be negligible).
96. See Davis, supra note 14, at 35; HUTCHINSON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 49; Cot-
ton, supra note 79, at 158.
97. See Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 340; Thomas P. DeFelice & Conrad G. Keyes, Jr.,
Executive Summary, in GUIDELINES FOR CLOUD SEEDING TO AUGMENT PRECIPITATION, supra note
82, at 1–2; Kwa, supra note 15, at 149–50.
98. See, e.g., Lance D. Wood, The Status of Weather Modification Activities Under United States
and International Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES L. 367, 389–91 (1977); Hene, supra note 6, at
287–88; Vaughn C. Ball, Shaping the Law of Weather Control, 58 YALE L.J. 213, 237–44 (1949).
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prospect of harm.99 The issue of ownership has always featured
prominently in legal discussions of weather modification, even in
the earliest law review articles.100 This issue continues to loom
large.101
Despite the ink spilled on the issue, no consensus has emerged
on what form of ownership is most appropriate for atmospheric
moisture. A variety of possible property rights arrangements have
been proposed and discussed. Broadly speaking, the proposals fall
into one of two categories. First, that ownership be premised on
ownership of the underlying land, either through the ad coelum rule
(the landowner owns all natural resources above and underneath
her land),102 the rule of capture (the landowner retains ownership
of the natural resources that are captured or utilized over her
land),103 or the natural-right doctrine (the landowner is to be pro-
tected from adverse interference with the natural weather
conditions over her land).104
The second category of proposals rejects private ownership, ei-
ther because of the intangible nature of atmospheric moisture or
because of concerns over redistribution. In addition to proposals
for public or state ownership,105 this category includes proposals to
treat atmospheric moisture as res communes, whereby atmospheric
99. See HUTCHINSON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 49.
100. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 6, at 703–04; Who Owns the Clouds?, supra note 5; see also
Howard J. Taubenfeld, Weather Modification and Control: Some International Legal Implications,
55 CAL. L. REV. 493, 496 (1967) (“There will be no discussion, however, of theories of owner-
ship, liability and the like within the domestic law context . . . [since] these problems have
been explored at length in many existing studies.”).
101. See, e.g., MA Rabie & MM Loubser, Legal Aspects of Weather Modification, 23 COMP. &
INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 177, 195–97 (1990) (writing that “[i]n order to discuss rights with regard to
precipitation, it is necessary first to consider certain aspects of property law” before proceed-
ing to duly analyze the issues such as the “ownership of air” and the “ownership of clouds.”).
The first legal issue identified by Virginia Simms in her examination of “the Law, Liability,
and Potential Dangers of Weather Modification” is “Cloud and Water Ownership under
Property Rights Law.” Simms, supra note 79, at 928–30. Similarly, Tarek Majzoub et al.
framed the first of the three issues they examined as “who has the [property] right to water in
clouds?” Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 322.
102. See Simms, supra note 79, at 929; Rabie & Loubser, supra note 101, at 196; Who Owns
the Clouds?, supra note 5, at 48–49. For general discussion about the ad coleum rule, see Rule,
supra note 3, at 806; K.K. DuVivier, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral—Wind? The Severed Wind Power
Rights Conundrum, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 69, 76 (2009).
103. Simms, supra note 79, at 929; Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 328–29; Who Owns the
Clouds?, supra note 5, at 49–51. See DAINTITH, supra note 20, at 3–50 (discussing the back-
ground and juridical recognition of the rule of capture in petroleum extraction); see also
Melissa H. Loja, Is the Rule of Capture Countenanced in the South China Sea? The Policy and Practice
of China, the Philippines and Vietnam, 32 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 483, 486–90 (2014)
(discussing the rule of capture in the international law context).
104. Who Owns the Clouds?, supra note 5, at 54–58.
105. Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 331–32 (in the context of precipitation); Who Owns
the Clouds?, supra note 5, at 57–60.
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moisture is common property of the public subject to the right of
enjoyment by the public,106 or res nullius, whereby the atmospheric
moisture is owned by no one.107
III. WEATHER-MODIFICATION REGULATIONS AND
OWNERSHIP AMONG THE 50 STATES
This Part examines how the fifty states regulate the use of atmos-
pheric moisture, and focuses on how the arrangements of property
rights to atmospheric moisture interact with the diverse array of
regulatory regimes that states have adopted.
A. Overview of Diverse Regulatory Regimes
1. Federal Law (or the Absence Thereof)
There are no comprehensive federal laws or regulations gov-
erning weather modification. Putting aside congressional acts that
created, funded, or directed regulatory agencies to conduct re-
search on weather-modification activities,108 the sole federal
legislation imposing actual regulatory controls on weather-modifi-
cation activities is the Weather Modification Reporting Act of
1972.109
As the Act’s title indicates, this short and straightforward piece of
legislation imposes an obligation to report weather-modification ac-
tivities. In the regulations implementing the statute, a “weather
106. Simms, supra note 79, at 929–30; Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 327, 361; Rabie &
Loubser, supra note 101, at 196–97. For general discussion, see Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads,
and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 89, 93–94 (2003); ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 143 (Blackstone
Press 1994).
107. Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 329–30.
108. See, e.g., National Weather Modification Policy Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-490, 90
Stat. 2359 (1976) (directing the Secretary of Commence to research and report to Congress
on the prospects of developing and implementing weather-modification regulations at the
national level); Weather Modification Evaluation Act, Pub. L. 256, 67 Stat. 559 (1953) (creat-
ing the Advisory Committee on Weather Control to evaluate private and public experiments
on weather modification). For discussions of these regulatory developments and their impli-
cations for the trajectory of weather-modification research, see Kwa, supra note 15, at 140;
Wood, supra note 98, at 374–76.
109. Weather Modification Reporting Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 330–330e (1971). For a
discussion of the federal government’s decision not to comprehensively regulate weather-
modification activities, see Ray Jay Davis, Future Legal Regulation of Weather Modification, 114 J.
IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE ENGINEERING 705, 706 (1988).
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modification activity” is defined as “any activity performed with the
intention of producing artificial changes in composition, behavior,
or dynamics of the atmosphere.”110 The information to be reported
includes the particular sponsor and operator, the timing and loca-
tion of the operation, and descriptions of the weather-modification
techniques used and the equipment employed.111 The reported in-
formation, save confidential information or information that is
otherwise prohibited from disclosure, shall be made publicly availa-
ble.112 The reporting entity must also keep and maintain more
detailed records of its weather-modification activities.113 Violations
of the reporting obligation are subject to a modest fine of up to
$10,000.114
No other federal controls exist in either the Act or other federal
laws and regulations. This lack of preemptive federal regulations
gives states a free opportunity to design their own weather-modifica-
tion regulatory regimes.115 The remainder of this Part examines
how states have exercised this freedom.
2. Has, Had, Never
The states have adopted a wide variety of weather modification
regulatory regimes. Most, however, have declined to legislate in this
realm. The most common state regulatory regime remains none at
all. At the beginning of 2015, eighteen states had passed legislation
concerning the conduct of weather-modification activities: Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada,
110. Maintaining Records and Submitting Reports on Weather Modification Activities, 15
C.F.R. § 908.1(c) (1976). All such activities must be reported, excluding those activities that
“can reasonably be expected to not modify the weather outside of the area of operation.” Id.
at § 908.3(c). Another interesting exception is one for “religious activities or other ceremo-
nies, rites and rituals intended to modify the weather.” Id. Oklahoma is the only state that has
a similar religious exception in its regulatory scheme on weather-modification activities. See
OKLA. STAT. Tit. 82 § 1087.1.8.4 (2014).
111. Maintaining Records and Submitting Reports on Weather Modification Activities, 15
C.F.R. § 908.4–908.6 (1976).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 330b (1971); 15 C.F.R. §908.12 (1976).
113. 15 C.F.R. §§ 908.8 & 908.11 (1976).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 330a & 330d (1971).
115. For critical discussion of the preemption doctrine in the U.S., see Michael P. More-
land, Preemption as Inverse Negligence Per Se, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1249, 1253–58 (2013);
Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Courts Preemption Jurisprudence, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 380–405 (2011); c.f., Wood, supra note 98, at 390–91 (arguing for
some minimum federal oversight over weather modifications given the inter-state ramifica-
tions of large-scale weather modification activities).
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North Dakota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.116
Another eight states, Illinois,117 Indiana,118 Iowa,119 Michigan,120
Minnesota,121 Nebraska,122 South Dakota,123 and West Virginia,124
formerly had laws concerning weather modification but have re-
pealed them. The actual number of such states, however, is likely
higher, as the legislative amendments affecting the repeal may have
completely removed any reference to the regime from the statute
books.125 While most of the eight states repealed their weather mod-
ification legislations in the 1990s, South Dakota’s (in 2012) and
Oklahoma’s (in May 2015) repealed theirs only recently.126
3. License/Permit Requirement
Among the eighteen states that currently have regulatory con-
trols over weather modification activities, approximately half have a
single-tier licence/permit requirement for weather-modification ac-
tivities. Kansas,127 Montana,128 Nevada,129 North Dakota,130
116. In addition, Maryland has statutory authorization for local governments in selected
counties to enact and implement regulations relating to weather modification activities. MD.
CODE § 13-701 (2013).
117. 5 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/4.6 (repealed 1992).
118. IND. CODE § 13-1-1.5-1–5-17 (repealed 1991).
119. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 361.1–361.7 (repealed 1994).
120. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 295.101–295.132 (repealed 2000).
121. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42.01–42.14 (enacted 1977, repealed 1999).
122. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-401 (repealed 1996).
123. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-3A-1–3 (repealed 2012). South Dakota’s eventual repeal of
the statute is worth noting given that it is the first state to have had a state-sponsored weather
modification program. In 1972, at its height, the program covered sixty percent of the land
area of the state, and a majority of the population used to be very supportive of the weather
modification in light of potential benefits to the state’s agriculture-based economy. Keyes,
supra note 82, at 12.
124. W. VA. ANN. CODE § 29-2B-1–29-2B-15 (repealed 1995).
125. One possible mechanism is through sunset provisions that automatically renders the
law void if the legislature do not actively passed a reauthorization. Davis, supra note 109, at
706.
126. H.B. 1420, OPEN STATES, http://openstates.org/ok/bills/2015-2016/HB1420/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2016). The bill was introduced with the barest of explanation concerning
rationale (i.e., “antiquated law” that has not been used) and passed with more than a ninety
percent majority without any substantive debate. Bill Info For HB 1420, OKLA. STATE LEGISLA-
TURE, http://oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=HB1420&Session=1500 (last visited Sept.
29, 2016). According to the spokesperson of the regulatory authority, weather modification
operations were carried out in the 1970s and 1980s, but there had been no operations since
1988 until an application in early 2015. Brian Brus, Making it Rain: Lawton Pursues Cloud
Seeding to Fight Drought, THE JOURNAL RECORD (Oklahoma City, OK), (Mar. 27, 2015), http://
journalrecord.com/2015/03/27/making-it-rain-lawton-wants-to-try-cloud-seeding-to-fight-
drought-general-news/.
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1406(a) (1974).
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Oklahoma,131 Texas,132 Washington,133 and Wisconsin134 employ a
dual-tier regulatory scheme, which requires would-be operators first
to secure a license and then to apply for a permit that will authorize
specific operations.135 California is a unique case; though it re-
pealed its license- and permit-requirement provisions in 1984, its
pre-operation public-notice136 and record-keeping requirements137
remain in place.
Substantively, though, this structural difference between regula-
tory regimes is largely immaterial. Regardless of whether a state has
single- or double-tier licensing, it almost invariably requires138 that
would-be weather-modifiers have “professional” competence or
qualifications in the field. There is a significant divergence among
jurisdictions, however, in what constitutes the requisite professional
qualifications. The majority of states define professionalism vaguely
or tautologically; the relevant laws call for “skill,” “competence,” or
“qualification” in “meteorology” and/or the intended weather-mod-
ification activities. Many states cede responsibility for promulgation
of more specific rules to the regulatory agency.139 Wisconsin,140 Kan-
sas,141 and New Mexico142 are the only states with more specific
128. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-201 (1967).
129. NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.120 (1961).
130. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04.1-11, -14 & -16 (1981).
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.7 (2014).
132. TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.101 (2003).
133. WASH. STAT. §§ 43.37.100 & .110 (1973).
134. WIS. STAT. § 93.35(2) (1977).
135. For general discussion about the structure of regulation relating to weather modifi-
cation activities, see George W. Bomar, Legal Aspects of Weather Modification Operations, in
GUIDELINES FOR CLOUD SEEDING TO AUGMENT PRECIPITATION, supra note 82, at 43, 44–50.
136. CAL. WATER CODE § 411 (Deering 1984).
137. Id. at § 420.
138. Colorado is an interesting exception: it requires only financial responsibility, eschew-
ing any requirement of professional expertise. This situation arose after it removed its
licensing requirement, which previously set forth the professional expertise requirement in
the context of a dual-layer regulatory scheme. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 36-20-110–112 (1972).
139. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.331(a) (LexisNexis 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:2207
(1956); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-203 (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.140(1) (1961); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-14.2 (1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.1.9.A (2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 558.060 (1955); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.103(a)(2) (2003); UTAH STAT. § 73-15-6 (1973);
WASH. STAT. § 43.37.100(1) (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-907(b) (1951).
140. WIS. STAT. § 93.35(4)(a) (1977) (“[C]onsistent with qualifications recognized by na-
tional or international professional and scientific associations concerned with weather
modification and meteorology.”).
141. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1407 (1974) (“[A]t least eight years of professional experi-
ence in weather modification field research or activities and has served for at least three years
as a project director of weather modification activities” or “a baccalaureate degree from a
recognized institution of higher learning in meteorology, engineering, mathematics or the
physical sciences and (A) Has had at least three seasons of experience in weather modifica-
tion field research or activities; (B) has satisfactorily completed the equivalent of at least 25
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legislative benchmarks. At the other extreme are Arizona143 and
Pennsylvania,144 which require would-be operators to provide infor-
mation related to their professional qualifications during the
application process but nonetheless do not expressly require that
applicants possess any particular level of expertise in order to re-
ceive a permit/license.
The capacity to meet financial liabilities that may arise from the
approved weather-modification activities is also a typical, but not
universal, condition for receiving a license. The main differences
are found in the breadth of liability that an operator must under-
take. The relevant provision may be narrowly worded, to primarily
cover accidents during the operation (e.g., “damages for liability on
account of accidents arising out of the weather modification opera-
tions”),145 or more broadly, to cover not only accidents but also
adverse weather effects (e.g., “obligations reasonably likely to be at-
tached to or result from the proposed weather modification
operation”).146 Nevada’s statute is uniquely unambiguous; it ex-
pressly excludes the latter type of liability.147
semester hours of meteorological studies and has had at least two seasons of practical experi-
ence in weather modification field research or activities; or (C) is certified by the weather
modification association.”).
142. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-3-7 (LexisNexis 1978) (“[S]kills and experience reasonably nec-
essary to the accomplishment of weather control without actionable injury to property or
person.”). This provision is intriguing in that the ostensibly specific criteria of “necessary” to
avoid “actionable injury to property or person” is actually highly ambiguous given the paucity
of court judgments on civil liabilities associated with weather modification activities in the
U.S. in general and starkly zero in New Mexico.
143. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-1603.A.3 (LexisNexis 1987).
144. 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1106(b)(2) (LexisNexis 1968).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.321 (LexisNexis 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1411(a)(4)
(1974). Similar statutory language can also be found in OR. REV. STAT. § 558.050 (1955) as
well as UTAH STAT. § 73-15-6 (1973)
146. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-112 (1972). Similar statutory language can also be found in
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-211 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04.1-16.1(a) & -19 (1981); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 75-3-7 (LexisNexis 1978); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1106(b)(5) (LexisNexis 1968);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.14 (2014); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.114 (2003); WASH. STAT.
§ 43.37.150 (1973); WIS. STAT. § 93.35(7) (1977).
147. NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.190 (1961) (“Proof of financial responsibility may be fur-
nished by an applicant by the applicant’s showing, to the satisfaction of the Director, the
applicant’s ability to respond in damages for liability which might reasonably be attached to
or result from weather modification and control activities in connection with the operation
for which the applicant seeks a permit; but the applicant need not show ability to respond in
damages for liability resulting from precipitation caused by weather modification
experiments.”).
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4. Information Management
Echoing the sole federal regulatory obligation—that is, report-
ing—state legislation typically imposes a reporting obligation upon
permitees/licensees. With the exception of Louisiana, which has no
explicit reporting requirement,148 the main variance among the
states is whether the reports are subject to public disclosure. The
majority (ten out of eighteen states) require public disclosure of
the reports.149 The reporting requirements of the states of Ari-
zona,150 California,151 Kansas,152 New Mexico,153 Utah,154 and
Wyoming155 do not explicitly contain the availability of a public
inspection.
Most states’ reporting requirements are unremarkable, as they
are highly similar to the federal requirement.156 One notable excep-
tion is Wisconsin; it requires operators to report, among other
things, “the times when there was modifiable weather but the per-
mittee did not operate and the reasons for not operating.”157
In addition to the data collection enabled by the reporting obli-
gation, pre-operation public-notice requirements seek to facilitate
anticipatory measures in view of the proposed weather modifica-
tions. Public notice is a common requirement; most states (thirteen
out of eighteen) have such provisions on the books.158 Of those
148. Instead, the statute imposes the duty to collect and evaluate information on the
regulator. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:2208 (1956) (“The commissioner shall evaluate each weather
modification operation and publish the results of such evaluation in an annual report.”).
149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-117 (1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.381 (LexisNexis 2014);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-3-301–303 (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.210 (1961); OKLA. STAT. tit.
82 § 1087.16 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 558.110 (1955); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1110 (LexisNexis
1968); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.117 (2003); WASH. STAT. § 43.37.170 (1973); WIS. STAT.
§ 93.35(12) (1977).
150. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-1604 (LexisNexis 1987).
151. CAL. WATER CODE § 420 (Deering 1984).
152. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1417 (1974).
153. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-3-9 (LexisNexis 1978).
154. UTAH STAT. § 73-15-5 (1973).
155. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-907(c) (1951).
156. There are three possible reasons for such seemingly redundant reporting require-
ments. First, some state statutes were enacted prior to the federal regulation. Second, states
may want to preserve the flexibility in determining the information that should be required.
Third, a state-level reporting requirement facilitates states’ access to information, especially
since state government (unlike other departments of the Federal government) do not have
automatic access to any reported information that has been designated confidential. Main-
taining Records and Submitting Reports on Weather Modification Activities, 15 C.F.R.
§ 908.12(a) (1976).
157. WIS. STAT. § 93.53(12)(b) (1977).
158. CAL. WATER CODE § 410 (Deering 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-112 (1972); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 403.361 (LexisNexis 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1411(a)(6) (1974); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-3-210 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-17 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 544.180 (1961); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.13 (2014); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1108 (LexisNexis
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thirteen, eight further provide for public hearings in conjunction
with the issuance of a particular permit/license, although the right
to a public hearing ranges from discretionary (i.e. providing that
officials may hold a hearing in response to post-notice objections by
the public)159 to mandatory (i.e., requiring officials to hold a hear-
ing regardless of whether any member of the public has actually
raised an objection).160
5. Regulatory Fees and Other Direct Financial Burdens
Typically, private entities engage in weather modification with
the goal of harnessing atmospheric moisture for their own benefit.
Accordingly, the public may object to weather modification on the
ground that it stands to redistribute a natural resource that was pre-
viously available to all (if haphazardly so).161 In this respect, it is
important to note how different states address such redistribution
when imposing fees and costs on weather-modifiers operators.
Most of the overt fees and costs states impose are the license/
permit fees discussed above. Many states have very modest fees, with
some even as low as $100.162 Although certain fees were established
decades ago and have remained unchanged, $100 remains rela-
tively modest—less than $1000, when adjusted for inflation.163 Still,
the flat-fee nature of these fees favors large-scale commercial
weather modification operations, whereas the structure subjects
1968); OR. REV. STAT. § 558.090 (1955); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.110 (2003); WIS. STAT.
§ 93.35(6)(c) (1977); WASH. STAT. § 43.37.140 (1973).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-17 (1981); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.107(b) (2003); see also
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1411(b) (1974) (stipulating that the regulatory authority “may hold a
public hearing” without stating the circumstances where such public hearing is warranted or
desired).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-112(2) (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-202(1) (1967);
OR. REV. STAT. § 558.055 (1955); WASH. STAT. § 43.37.110(6) (1973); WIS. STAT.
§ 93.53(6)(c) (1977).
161. STEINBERG, supra note 79, at 115–16.
162. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-1603 (LexisNexis 1987) ($100 per license); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 403.311(2) & 331(3) (LexisNexis 2014) ($1000 for application, and $50 for annual
renewal); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1408 (1974) ($100 annual license fee & $100 for permit);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:2203 (1956) ($100 per license); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04.1-14.1 & -16.1
(1981) ($50 annual license fee; $25 for each operation permit); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-3-6
(LexisNexis 1978) ($100 annual license fee); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.9.B (2014) ($100
annual license fee); OR. REV. STAT. § 558.010 (1955) ($100 license fee); 3 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1106 (LexisNexis 1968) ($100 annual license fee); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-907(b) (1951)
($100 for each permit).
163. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/infla-
tion_calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).
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small and medium enterprises to disproportionately heavy financial
burdens.
Nevada, Montana, Washington, and Wisconsin stand out for im-
posing fees that more closely track the scale of the weather-
modification activities. Nevada164 and Washington165 set permit fees
at one and one-half percent of the estimated cost of operation, and
Montana sets them at one percent.166 Wisconsin, though also charg-
ing one percent, assesses that charge on the value of the contract,
which tends to be higher than the actual cost of the operations.167
Another dimension of the redistributive effect is the manner in
which states allocate the costs of running the regulatory regime it-
self. Although the collected license/permit fees are often
earmarked for operating the regulatory regime,168 a flat modest li-
cense/permit fee is unlikely to cover a state’s actual costs of
regulation.169 In this respect, it is noteworthy that Colorado, al-
though it sets the base permit fee at $100, does mandate upward
adjustments for commercial weather-modification projects, to cover
the expenses of the approval process (e.g., application review, pub-
lic hearing, and post-application monitoring).170 Montana’s similar
cost-recovery provision is more aggressive still, given that the state
already imposes substantial permit fees.171
Beyond direct cost recovery, there are subtler means by which
states may lessen their regulatory costs. One example comes in the
form of the public-notice requirement, which exists in thirteen
states. Montana,172 North Dakota,173 and Wisconsin174 place notice
obligations on the regulatory authority, but the remaining states
164. NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.200 (1961). This is in addition to the $100 license fee. See NEV.
REV. STAT. § 544.140 (1961).
165. WASH. STAT. § 43.37.160 (1973). This is in addition to the $100 license fee. See WASH.
STAT. § 43.37.100(2) (1973).
166. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-212 (1967). This is in addition to the $100 license fee. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-205 (1967).
167. WIS. STAT. § 93.35(6)(g) (1977) (stating that if there is no contract, the estimated
cost of the weather modification operations will be used). This is in addition to the $100
license fee. See WIS. STAT. § 93.35(4) (1977).
168. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-213 (1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.6.B. (2014).
Some states deposit the permits fees to the general fund. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-
14 (1981); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.060 (2003).
169. See Davis, supra note 109, at 707 (noting that “in at least one state lack of funding
[has] curtailed regulatory activities”).
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-113 (1972).
171. This includes the costs of conducting the public meeting, preparing the environ-
mental impact statement, publication of notice of intention: MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-202(1)
& -210(2) (1967).
172. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-210 (1967).
173. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-17 (1981).
174. WIS. STAT. § 93.35(6)(c) (1977).
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put those obligations on the applicants. Applicants must submit
proof of a conforming newspaper publication before their permit
can be approved.175 This cost-shifting has clear implications. Mon-
tana has an independent provision requiring applicants to
reimburse the state for the costs of regulatory-approval,176 but appli-
cants in North Dakota and Wisconsin are exempted from otherwise
substantial newspaper-advertising fees. Placing the notification bur-
den on the regulatory authority cannot be explained by cost
advantages (e.g., the state creating a centralized official notification
avenue) because, in all three states, the regulatory authority is re-
quired by statute to use conventional media outlets (i.e.,
newspapers) to satisfy the public-notification obligations.177
6. Legal Liability
Sometimes, the enacted legislation seeks to clarify the legal liabil-
ity that may arise from conducting weather modification activities.
A majority of states have provisions that expressly preclude any state
liability for damages for weather-modification activities approved in
conformity with the state’s regulatory scheme.178 In any event, this
disclaimer is likely unnecessary, as states by default usually enjoy
considerable immunity from civil liability relating to its regulatory
regimes.179
Considerably more interesting is how state regulatory regimes ad-
dress civil liability of non-state actors. One approach, which has
been adopted by Kansas,180 Oklahoma,181 Nevada,182 Washington,183
175. CAL. WATER CODE § 410 (Deering 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-112 (1972); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 403.361 (LexisNexis 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1411(a)(6) (1974); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 544.180 (1961); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.13 (2014); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1108 (Lexis-
Nexis 1968); OR. REV. STAT. § 558.090 (1955); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.110 (2003); WASH.
STAT. § 43.37.140 (1973).
176. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-3-202(1), 85-3-210(2) (1967).
177. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-3-210 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-17 (1981); WIS.
STAT. § 93.35(6)(c) (1977).
178. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-122 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1420 (1974); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-3-104 (1967); NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.230 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-
36 (1981); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.19 (2014); TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.301 (2003); WASH.
STAT. § 43.37.190 (1973); WIS. STAT. § 93.35(13) (1977); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-909 (1951).
179. Ken Lerner, Governmental Negligence Liability Exposure in Disaster Management, 23 URB.
LAW. 333, 339–40 (1991) (“The discretionary function test was adopted by the federal govern-
ment in the Federal Tort Claims Act, and some version of discretionary immunity is
recognized by nearly every state.”); Steven J. Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhanc-
ing the Quality of Care of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 651,
663 n.49 (1990).
180. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1422 (1974) (explaining that regulatory compliance shall pro-
vide no defense in actions for damages or injunctive relief).
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and Wyoming,184 is to declare that the regulatory scheme had no
effect on the contract, tort, or other legal liabilities of private enti-
ties, which essentially leaves it entirely to the courts to determine
the appropriate resolution of disputes.
Another approach is to alter or clarify the civil liability of private
entities, particularly tort liability. There is no dominant pattern of
such adjustments. Some states seek to limit the liability of weather
modifiers. For example, Utah clarifies that approved operations do
not lead to a presumption concerning trespass and nuisance.185
Other states adopt a form of give-and-take. Texas, for example,
removes ultra-hazardous-activity liability (i.e., liability without fault),
but otherwise purports not to change the terms of legal relation-
ships, and goes so far as to specify that the bare fact of regulatory
compliance shall be inadmissible.186 North Dakota similarly speci-
fies that weather modification activities shall not be subject to strict
liability (i.e., liability without fault) and trespass liability (for sub-
stances disseminated into the atmosphere in accordance with the
permit), while at the same time leaving negligence and intentional-
tort liability intact, again to the point of rendering inadmissible the
fact that the weather modification activities are conducted in com-
pliance with a valid license and permit.187 Wisconsin’s provision
resembles North Dakota’s, while adding that failure to comply with
the license and permit requirement constitutes negligence.188 This
is Colorado’s approach as well; it removes trespass and nuisance
liability (both public and private), but provides that any violation of
the permit requirement constitutes negligence per se189 and that
compliance with a permit is inadmissible as a defense in actions for
damages or injunctive relief.190
Pennsylvania takes an interesting and surprisingly direct ap-
proach to civil liability arising from weather effects: compensation is
to be determined administratively191 by the Weather Modification
181. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 1087.19 (2014).
182. NEV. REV. STAT. § 544.200 (1961).
183. WASH. STAT. § 43.37.190 (1973).
184. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-909 (1951).
185. UTAH STAT. § 73-15-7 (1973).
186. TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.302 (2003).
187. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-37 (1981).
188. WIS. STAT. § 93.35(14) (1977).
189. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-123 (1972).
190. Id. at § 36-20-124.
191. 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1114 (LexisNexis 1968) (“Any licensee who causes a drought as
determined by the board shall compensate farmers for damages. Any licensee who by causing
heavy downpours or storms which cause damage to lands as determined by the board shall
compensate farmers and property owners for such damages.”).
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Board.192 Beyond providing an alternative avenue for this difficult
factual issue, Pennsylvania courts have used this provision to fore-
close demands for injunctive relief, on the grounds that the
provision provides “adequate relief at law.”193 It would be illuminat-
ing to examine how this administrative determination has operated
in practice, particularly as a possible alternative to judicial adjudica-
tion.194 In particular, the existence of at least one scientific expert
(the Dean of the College of Earth Sciences at Pennsylvania State
University, alongside regulators of relevant agencies, is expressly
designated as a member of the seven-member board)195 might have
a positive influence in properly assessing the scientific evidence and
expert testimonies in determining causation.196 Unfortunately, how-
ever, there have been no newspaper reports of any disputes being
adjudicated by that administrative organ.197 Indeed, there is not
even a webpage within the Pennsylvania state government website
that displays the composition and activities of the Weather Modifi-
cation Board.198
7. Diversity in the Face of Uncertainty
Before diving into the core issue of the relationship between
property rights and the regulatory regime, it is worth assessing the
significant differences between states’ weather-modification regula-
tory regimes as those differences emerge from the above survey. In
terms of structure, substantive rules, and even the basic decision of
192. 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (LexisNexis 1968).
193. Pennsylvania Nat. Weather Ass’n v. Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass’n, 44 Pa.
D. & C.2d 749 (1968).
194. See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Regulatory Science in Rulemaking and
Tort: Unifying the Weight of the Evidence Approach, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 65, 90–102 (2013)
(discussing how the weight of evidence approach adopted by regulatory agencies, which gives
different evidentiary weights to scientific studies in accordance to their reliability, is superior
to the corpuscular approach, which completely rejects scientific studies that have reliability
issues. Courts typically use the corpuscular approach in tort litigations in terms of dealing
with scientific uncertainty).
195. 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (LexisNexis 1968).
196. Andrei Shleifer, Efficient Regulation, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES
FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 27, 38 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011); Ann Bloom, Zen and the Art of
Tort Litigation, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11, 23–24 (2010). For general discussion about the extent
and implication of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the leading
U.S. Supreme case on expert testimony, see ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW
196–97 (2005); Peter W. Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom: The Impact on Innovation, in
PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 138,
141–46 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones eds., 1994).
197. Search, Feb. 1, 2016, Factiva.
198. Official Website for the State of Pennsylvania, PA.GOV, http://www.pa.gov/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2016).
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whether to regulate, there is no clear consensus among the fifty
states, despite over a half century of regulatory experience.199 Given
such significant diversity, it is natural to ask which regulatory re-
gime (or combination thereof)200 is normatively desirable, whether
in terms of efficiency, fairness, or other criteria.201 This normative
question is not an easy one to answer; answering it would require
massive and often unavailable data on the costs, benefits and redis-
tributive effects of the regulation.202 The difficulty of the inquiry is
only further compounded by the considerable scientific uncertainty
surrounding causes and effects. Such uncertainty is a basic problem
for many emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology203 and ge-
netically modified organisms.204
The same holds true for weather modification. Despite the re-
sources and effort that have been devoted worldwide to the
advancement of weather-modification technologies, the process of
precipitation formation, and the effect of human intervention, re-
mains quite poorly understood.205 The most fundamental obstacle
199. While one might argue that there is a trend towards repeal, Maryland’s statutory
authorization for county-level weather modification regulations was instituted recently in
2013. See MD. CODE § 13-701 (2013). It is also worth noting the recent enactment of weather
modifications laws and regulations in other jurisdictions. See e.g., Rengong yingxiang tianqi
guanli tiaoli [Regulations on Administration of Weather Modification] (promulgated by St.
Council, Mar. 19, 2002, effective May 1, 2002) (P.R.C.).
200. For discussion on the different regulatory approaches, such as disclosure to assist
market participants, prohibition or mandating of certain conduct, and restrictions on owner-
ships, among others, see ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 105–33 (2nd ed. 2012); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Gov-
ernment Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS:
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13, 25–32 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds.,
2009); Kay et al., supra note 71, at 289–01, 312–16.
201. See BALDWIN, CAVE & LODGE, supra note 200, at 26–31 (discussing the five criteria of
legislative mandate, accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency for good regula-
tion). See also John Kay & John Vickers, Regulatory Reform in Britain, 3 ECON. POL’Y 285, 303–08
(1988) (discussing the possible goals of efficiency and redistribution, but opining that distri-
butional considerations should be dealt with instruments other than regulation). It is also
worth noting that just like how the optimal property rights arrangement depends on the
natural resource’s particular characteristics and use pattern, the normatively desirable regu-
latory regime would vary in accordance with specific socioeconomic conditions.
202. See also BALDWIN, CAVE & LODGE, supra note 200, at 34–37 (discussing the challenges
of assessing regulatory quality, such as to how to balance between the different benchmarks
arising from conflicting objectives, deciding whether the aspect of the regulation is input,
process, outputs, or outcome, to measure, and discerning the causative relationship where
there are multiple regulators with overlapping and/or cumulative regulatory function).
203. Eisner, supra note 13, at 29–42; JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, NANOTECHNOLOGY REGULA-
TION AND POLICY WORLDWIDE 155–84 (2006).
204. See Daele, supra note 13, at 118–20 (discussing the complications posed by the per-
ception of risks that can be rather disconnected from actual risks, in the context of
genetically modified organisms).
205. GOUDIE, supra note 78, at 226–27; Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 341–43; HUTCHIN-
SON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 54; Kwa, supra note 15, at 162.
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is simply the natural variability of weather—namely, many of the
observed changes in weather conditions (whether short term or
long term) are simply naturally-occurring fluctuations.206 A related
reason is the limitations of current technologies. In the best-case
scenario, weather modification operations can typically enhance
precipitation by ten to twenty percent, with the conjuration of rain
in the absence of complementary cloud conditions remaining unat-
tainable.207 Another obstacle is the double edge of causation:
weather modification operators are eager to claim credit for in-
tended weather while at the same time acutely aware of the legal
liability that may result from weather-related damages.208 The lack
of coordination between scientific and commercial cloud-seeding
operations may also impede accurate analysis; the results, or lack
thereof, may have been affected by neighboring weather modifica-
tion activities.209
How regulators should respond to such uncertainty is a substan-
tial issue that is the main inquiry of a companion piece to this
Article.210 This Article takes the preliminary position that the diver-
sity in regulatory approaches is both understandable and desirable,
due to the fundamental uncertainty. These diverse approaches are
understandable, because one should not expect to observe regula-
tory convergence when there is no consensus concerning the harms
associated with the regulated activity. These approaches are also de-
sirable, because the diversity facilitates a natural experiment to test
the efficacy and other practical consequences of the various regula-
tory approaches.211
206. COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 243–44; Orville, supra note 15, at 447–49.
207. GOUDIE, supra note 78, at 226–27; Orville, supra note 15, at 447–49; Cotton, supra
note 79, at 141–53; Bartlett, supra note 14, at 30. One highly rigorous cloud-seeding experi-
ment included a randomized control over a six year period and found that seeding of
appropriate clouds increased precipitation by five to fifteen percent. Alexandra Witze, Major
Clouding-Seeding Test Gives Mixed Results, NATURE: NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014), http://
www.nature.com/news/major-cloud-seeding-test-gives-mixed-results-1.16537.
208. Kwa, supra note 15, at 138–39, 148–49; Fleming, supra note 16, at 12; Davis, supra
note 14, at 11–12. See also Majzoub et al., supra note 78, at 342 (“However, small rainmaker
organizations, who work for local farmers, are usually very secretive about when and where
they attempt to make rain. The clandestine nature of the cloud seeding business can cause
difficulties in tracking down potential defendants in cloud modification cases.”).
209. HUTCHINSON & HERRMANN, supra note 16, at 49.
210. Jianlin Chen, Regulating Uncertainty: A Critical Survey of U.S. States’ Regulations on
Weather Modification (forthcoming).
211. See Michael Greenstone, Effective Regulation Through Credible Cost-Benefit Analysis: The
Opportunity Costs of Superfund, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGU-
LATION 52, 53 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2009) (noting the caveat that a
rigorous and well-funded review of the “experimentation” of regulation is important to draw
the right conclusion and avoid manipulation of the result); MATSUURA, supra note 203, at
150–51 (discussing how the benefits of experimenting with different regulatory approaches
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B. Property Rights in Cloud Water
Given the instinctive appeal of property rights issues, it should
not be surprising that, when the regulatory regime makes any refer-
ences to atmospheric moisture rights, property rights are one of the
first issues addressed. Although it is possible to argue that the
broadly worded constitutional and/or statutory provisions of cer-
tain states that claim public rights over water might be interpreted
to include atmospheric water,212 five states—Colorado,213 Louisi-
ana,214 New Mexico,215 North Dakota,216 and Wyoming217—have
made express declarations of their “sovereign right”218 to atmos-
pheric moisture. North Dakota’s provision comes in a section
entitled “[e]xtended state ownership of water sovereignty over
in the context of nanotechnology—an emerging technology—must be balanced against the
initial confusion and inefficiency).
212. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (1913) (“The water of all sources of water supply
within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the ground,
belongs to the public.”); see also TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 59(a) (“The conservation and develop-
ment of all of the natural resources of this State, including . . . the preservation and
conservation of all such natural resources of the State[,] are each and all hereby declared
public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate
thereto.”).
213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-103 (1972) (“The general assembly declares that the state
of Colorado claims the right to all moisture suspended in the atmosphere which falls or is
artificially induced to fall within its borders. Said moisture is declared to be the property of
the people of this state, dedicated to their use pursuant to section 5 and 6 of article XVI of
the Colorado constitution and as otherwise provided by law.”). These state constitutional
provisions establish that the right to divert unappropriated waters (which are property of the
public) for beneficial uses shall never be denied, but when faced with scarcity, domestic pur-
poses shall be given top priority, followed by agricultural purposes and then manufacturing
purposes. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 & 6.
214. LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:2201 (1956) (“[T]he state of Louisiana claims its sovereign right
to the use for the best interest of its people of the moisture contained in the clouds and
atmosphere within its state boundaries.”).
215. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-3-3 (LexisNexis 1978) (“[T]he state of New Mexico claims the
right to all moisture in the atmosphere which would fall so as to become a part of the natural
streams or percolated water of New Mexico . . . .”).
216. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-01 (2010) (“The state of North Dakota claims its sover-
eign right to use the moisture contained in the clouds and atmosphere within the state
boundaries.”).
217. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-905(a)(i) (1951) (“The state of Wyoming claims its sovereign
right to the use for its residents and best interests of the moisture contained in the clouds
and atmosphere within its sovereign state boundaries.”). For a brief discussion of this legisla-
tive amendment in the context of overall historical development of Wyoming water laws, see
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Development of Wyoming Water Law, 14 WYO. L. REV. 327, 361
(2014).
218. For discussion about how sovereign rights are often regarded as equivalent to prop-
erty rights, see supra note 20.
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moisture.”219 Montana stands out in this respect; its state constitu-
tion expressly declares all water, including “atmospheric water,” to
be the property of the state.220
In three states—New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas—courts have
had the chance to make pronouncements on this issue, albeit to
differing degrees. In Pennsylvania, the issue was examined in a full
trial by the first-instance court.221 In Texas222 and New York,223 the
judgments rendered involved only temporary injunctions, although
in Texas the case was eventually appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court.224
Substantively, the three states’ courts came to three quite differ-
ent conclusions. In New York, the court rejected the claims of a
plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction against a resort owner’s
cloud-seeding operations. The court denied the injunction for,
among other legal and factual reasons, the lack of any vested prop-
erty rights in the clouds or the moisture.225 Although it thus
rejected the idea of private ownership rights over atmospheric
moisture, the court did not further clarify or discuss the property
rights arrangement. The later Pennsylvania court correctly ob-
served that the New York court’s “language concerning vested
property rights in clouds and moisture was dicta, unsupported by
legal authority or reason.”226 The inconclusive and preliminary
character of the court’s engagement with the property rights issue,
together with the fact that there is no weather modification regula-
tory regime in the state of New York,227 limits the relevance of that
decision for this Article.
The courts in Texas reached a different conclusion than did
their New York counterpart. The courts granted the plaintiff a tem-
porary injunction to restrain weather modification activities over
the plaintiff’s land, reasoning that a landowner is to be legally pro-
tected from improper interference with the natural rainfall,
particularly from weather-modification activities that are conducted
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-01 (2010).
220. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3) (“All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric
waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people
and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.”).
221. Pa. Nat. Weather Ass’n v. Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass’n, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d
749, 749 (1968).
222. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Tex. App. 1958);
Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. App. 1958).
223. Slutksy v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 238 (1950).
224. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, 327 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Supreme Ct.
1959).
225. 97 N.Y.S. 2d 238, 239 (1950).
226. Pa. Nat. Weather Ass’n, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d at 757.
227. Supra Part IV.A.2.
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directly over his or her land.228 Notably, although the judgment
came only in the context of granting a preliminary injunction,
rather than as the result of a full trial, the trial court and the court
of appeals “carefully considered the voluminous record and exhib-
its that were admitted in evidence” and discussed the various legal
authorities and scholarly literature on the issue.229
A decade after the Texas decisions, the Pennsylvania court
adopted something of a hybrid approach. After discussing the New
York and Texas actions and addressing a copious amount of schol-
arly literature, the court held that because “[m]oisture in the
clouds is common property belonging to everyone who will benefit
from what occurs naturally in the clouds . . . [e]very owner of land
has a property right in the moisture in the clouds and the right to
receive that moisture in its natural form subject to such weather
modification activities as shall be carried out by governmental au-
thorities in the public, as opposed to private, interest.”230 That
holding granted the landowner rights akin to those granted by the
Texas court, but with explicit subjugation to the public interest that
reflects the rationale of the New York courts.231 In addition, the
Pennsylvania court held that when adequate remedies are pro-
vided—in that case, statutory damages as determined by the
regulatory authority232—there exists no equitable right to an
injunction.233
In sum, six states have made legislative or constitutional claims to
sovereign property rights in atmospheric moisture, while the courts
in two states have declared that landowners possess private rights to
the atmospheric moisture above their land.
228. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App. 1958);
Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App. 1958). Both
cases are affirmed together in Jones, 327 S. W.2d.
229. Duncan, 319 S. W.2d at 943–44; Rounsaville, 320 S. W.2d at 215–16. The Texas Su-
preme Court took pains to emphasize the provisional nature of the lower courts purported
holding and finding, and stressed the appeals court reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jones,
327 S. W.2d at 421.
230. Pa. Nat. Weather Ass’n, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d at 763.
231. Slutksy v. City of New York, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 238, 240 (1950) (“This court must balance
the conflicting interests between a remote possibility of inconvenience to plaintiffs’ resort
and its guests with the problem of maintaining and supplying the inhabitants of the City of
New York and surrounding areas, with a population of about 10 million inhabitants, with an
adequate supply of pure and wholesome water.”).
232. Supra notes 190–197 and accompanying text.
233. Pa. Nat. Weather Ass’n, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d at 764.
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C. Relationship Between Property Rights and Regulation
What, then, is the relationship, if any, between a state’s pro-
nouncements of property rights in atmospheric moisture and the
regulatory regime of that state?
1. The Irrelevance of State Ownership
The most counterintuitive finding is that a state’s express asser-
tion of state ownership over atmospheric moisture bears little
relation to the corresponding regulatory regime, both in terms of
the regime’s redistributive characteristics and in terms of the extent
of the regime’s control. Initially, one might expect that such a dec-
laration would be accompanied by the imposition of substantially
larger permit/license fees to reflect the granting of privileges to
harness these ostensibly publicly owned natural resources.234 How-
ever, among the six states (Colorado, Louisiana, Montana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming) that contain such express
statutory or constitutional declarations, Montana alone charges sub-
stantial fees for the permits that seek to tap into this natural
resource.235 Conversely, the other three states that charge substan-
tial fees for the regulatory permits—Nevada, Washington and
Wisconsin236—do so in the absence of such declarations. The small
sample size precludes any meaningful statistical inquiry, but the fact
that substantial fees are actually levied by a higher ratio of states
without such a declaration (1:4 vs 1:6) does suggest that the expec-
tation that greater redistribution will arise from state ownership of a
natural resource may be unfounded, at least in the context of
weather modification. Indeed, it is interesting that North Dakota,
which has the most strongly worded provision (i.e., a direct claim of
“state ownership”) in its weather modification regulation, is also
one of only three states in which the obligation (and consequential
234. Chen & Cui, supra note 4, at 91–92 (discussing the public perception that the decla-
ration of state ownership over wind and sunlight by a provincial government in China was
intended to generate revenue through permit fees); Maniruzzaman, supra note 21, at 83–85
(discussing the various manifestations of resource nationalism, including nationalizing the
relevant industry sector, that are driven by the states’ desire for a greater share in the profits
of their natural resources).
235. Infra Part IV.A.5. Relatedly, note that in stark contrast with the lax position over use
of atmospheric moisture, Wyoming is actually the first U.S. state to impose a tax on wind
energy production in the state, purportedly for “the privilege of producing electricity from
wind resources” in Wyoming. Walter Wang, Challenging State Taxation of Renewable Energy: Will
Wyoming be the Battleground?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 451, 455–56 (2011).
236. Infra Part IV.A.5.
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costs) of public notification are borne by the regulatory authorities,
to the significant benefit of applicants.237
Similar indeterminacy can be observed when it comes to the vari-
ous possible regulatory burdens. Assertion of state ownership has
often been seen as a prelude to more aggressive regulatory control
over the use of natural resources,238 but Louisiana and Wyoming
are among the four states that do not have the requirement of fi-
nancial responsibility as a condition of regulatory approval.239
There is a disproportionate absence of the significant costs of pro-
viding insurance, corporate surety bond, or cash deposit in
conjunction with the application among states with state ownership
of atmospheric moisture (1:3 vs 1:6). In a similar vein, there are no
obligations of public notification in Louisiana, New Mexico, and
Wyoming; these three form the majority of the five states that do
not have such requirements.240
2. Constraints of Private Rights
This seeming independence of state ownership and the form of
regulatory regime stands in contrast to private ownership of atmos-
pheric moisture. In Texas and Pennsylvania—states whose courts,
as explained above, have granted landowners certain rights over at-
mospheric moisture241— the regulatory regimes contain unique
provisions that are unique to those states. In Texas, the regulatory
authority must first find “that the weather modification and control
operation as proposed in the permit application will not signifi-
cantly dissipate the clouds and prevent their natural course of
developing rain in the area in which the operation is to be con-
ducted to the material detriment of persons or property in that
area.”242 This specific requirement contrasts with other states’ provi-
sions, which either have vague language concerning the promotion
237. Infra Part IV.A.5.
238. Pinto, supra note 21, at 997–98 (comparatively discussing the Brazilian and Ameri-
can legal regime on hydrocarbon ownership and arguing that “public ownership of
hydrocarbons provides the government with more flexibility to foster national policy goals as
expressed, for example, by the local content requirement of Brazil’s regulation”); Chen &
Cui, supra note 4, at 91–92 (discussing the public perception that the declaration of state
ownership over wind and sunlight by a provincial government in China was in fact an attempt
to expand regulatory power).
239. Infra Part IV.A.3.
240. Infra Part IV.A.4.
241. Infra Part IV.B.
242. TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.107(a) (2004).
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of general public welfare243 or lack specific conditions beyond pro-
fessional qualifications, financial responsibility, and/or public
notification.244
Similarly, Pennsylvania has an explicit statutory provision for ad-
ministratively-determined compensation liability for landowners
harmed by adverse weather effects arising from approved weather
modification activities. This provision is sui generis: other states ei-
ther leave civil liability unresolved or alter civil liability in a way that
does not unambiguously provide affected landowners with a right
to claim damages for adverse weather effects from approved
weather-modification activities.245
Although different in content and form, the Texas and Penn-
sylvania provisions are conceptually similar: both are designed to
safeguard landowner rights over atmospheric moisture. The Texas
provision is essentially protecting the landowner’s rights via an ina-
lienability rule,246 because the regulator must make a finding of no
detriment without any explicit provision made for the possibility of
consent by the affected landowners.247 Of course, if in practice the
regulator would consider evidence of consent by the affected land-
owners (e.g., written agreement procured by valuable
considerations or otherwise) as evidence of no detriment, then the
protection would be more akin to a property rule protection. Con-
versely, the Pennsylvania provision utilizes a liability rule to protect
landowner rights. The landowner is granted the explicit right to
monetary compensation for damages caused by weather-modifica-
tion activities but lacks any other manifestation of that right. The
regulator granting the license need not address potential harms
that the proposed weather-modification activities might cause to
243. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 558.060(1) (2015) (“(b) The production, management or con-
servation of water or energy resources or agricultural or forest crops could be benefited by
the proposed weather modification operation; and (c) The proposed weather modification
operation would not be injurious to the public health or safety.”); WASH. STAT.
§ 43.37.110(5) (1973) (“for the general welfare and public good”); WIS. STAT.
§93.35(6)(d)(3) (2012) (“is reasonably conceived to improve water quality or quantity, re-
duce losses from weather hazards, provide economic benefits to the people of this state,
advance or enhance scientific knowledge or otherwise carry out the objectives and purposes
of this section”).
244. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-1603(A) (LexisNexis 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.331(1)
(LexisNexis 2014).
245. Infra Part IV.A.6.
246. An inalienability rule is where the law decides both who the entitlement owner is
and prohibit even voluntary transfer of the entitlement. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Me-
lamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, And Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1111–15 (1972).
247. TEX. AGRIC. CODE § 301.107(a) (2004).
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neighboring land,248 and courts will not grant an injunction, be-
cause monetary damages are available.249
3. Disparate Legal Effect
The differential effect of property rights on the corresponding
regulatory regime should not come as a surprise. Although there is
a common and understandable concern that declarations of state
ownership are often a pretext for expanding government/regula-
tory power over private conduct that has traditionally been free
from state interference,250 there are usually no legal constraints that
dictate that outcome. Unlike the ubiquitous federal and state con-
stitutional protections against takings of private property,251 legal
restrictions on the disposition of state-owned property are fairly un-
common, at least in common law jurisdictions.252 And even when
such legal restrictions do exist (such as in anti-donation clauses
found in several U.S. states253), they tend to be thinner in breadth
248. 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1106 (LexisNexis 2008).
249. Supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text.
250. Such concerns and such arguments are commonly raised even outside of the United
States. They have been raised, for example, by opponents of a provincial regulation in China
that declares climate resources (defined to include wind energy, solar energy and atmos-
pheric water) to be property of the state. See Chen & Cui, supra note 4, at 92–93 (2013).
251. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a survey of constitutional protections among the states,
see JULIUS SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS LAW ON EMINENT DOMAIN, Ch. 6 § 6.01(12)(c) (3d ed.
2008).
252. In modern civil law jurisdictions such as France and Germany, a category of publicly
owned property exists that cannot be readily privatized. Known as “public property proper”
in Germany (as distinguished from “public financial assets”) and “state public property” in
France (as distinguished from “state-owned private property”), these properties either have a
beneficial function to the public or are directly utilized by the public. Examples include
public roads, parks, and navigable rivers. Patrice Chretien, The Property of Public Bodies, in THE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION? 311, 316–25 (Matthias Ruffert
ed., 2009); Laurent Ayne´s, Property Law, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 148 (George A.
Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., 2008); MURRAY RAFF, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GERMAN REAL PROPERTY LAW 161–62 (2003); JOHN
BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 282 (1998). This approach reflects the civilian con-
ceptualization of public property, which is based on public use and which can be traced to
Roman Law. Giacinto della Cananea, From (Public) Ownership to Use: A Comparative Analysis, in
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION?, supra, at 297, 299–301;
Rose, supra note 106, at 96–100.
253. Anti-donation clauses attempt to limit sub-market value transfers of public property
to private entities. Jurisdictions with such clauses include New York, see N.Y. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1 (“No county, city, town, village or school district shall give or loan any money or property
to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association, or private undertak-
ing . . . [subject to various exceptions]”) and Washington State, see WASH. CONST. Art. VIII,
§ 7 (“No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or
property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or
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and depth. In general, either satisfaction of public purpose or valu-
able consideration will suffice to allow a state to transfer ownership
of its state-owned property. This contrasts with the need for both
public purpose and adequate compensation in order to take private
property.254
Conversely, the more robust constitutional protections given to
private property mean that, when a private entity holds private
rights to a natural resource, any regulatory control or state interfer-
ence with the use of that natural resource may be subject to
considerably greater legal constraints. At first glance, then, the fo-
cus of this Article—the relationship between property rights and
regulation—might seem to call for a lengthy discussion of regula-
tory takings. But the existing doctrines of regulatory takings cannot
easily explain the effect of private rights on the regulatory regimes
in Texas and Pennsylvania. Although regulatory-taking claims do
cast a shadow over legislative or regulatory endeavors that might
diminish the economic value of private property, the high thresh-
old for actionable regulatory takings—a regulatory taking is usually
only actionable if it stands to extinguish all economically viable ac-
tivities on the land255—means that the state remains amply
endowed with general regulatory and taxing powers to address the
indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.”).
For discussion of the origins and limitations of such clauses, see John Martinez, Getting Back
the Public’s Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in American Property Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 619,
653–59 (2010); Charles W. Godner, Jr., State and Local Government Fiscal Responsibility: An Inte-
grated Approach, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 927–38 (1991).
254. See, e.g., Citizens Protecting Resources v. Yakima County, 152 Wash.App. 914, 920
(Wash. App. 2009) (discussing the two-pronged analysis that first examines whether the
transfer is for “a fundamental purpose of the government”, and if is not, proceeds to ex-
amine whether sufficient consideration has been or will be received by the government). See
Martinez, supra note 253, at 662–71 (sketching an “anti-favoritism” norm in the U.S., and
proposing a legal test whereby any transfer of public asset must be either accompanied by
either sufficient monetary consideration or for a public purpose). For a critical discussion
about how judicial deference in interpreting the “public purpose” requirement has essen-
tially nullified the requirement, see Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 910–15 (2003); Dale F. Rubin, Public
Purpose in the Northwest: A Sinkhole of Judicial Interpretation—the Case for Alternatives in the Delivery
of Public Services and the Granting of Subsidies, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 417, 420–30 (1996).
255. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 153–214 (Lexis Nexis 3rd ed. 2005). In the
context of land use and environmental protection, see ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM
& RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1999). Around the world, most countries typically have a simi-
lar or higher threshold to establish an actionable regulatory taking. See Matthew C.
Porterfield, State Practice and the (Purported) Obligation Under Customary International Law to Pro-
vide Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 159, 171–86
(2011) (surveying selected countries’ regulatory-takings doctrines); Michael Wilkinson, Land,
in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 359, 392–94 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds.,
2011) (discussing the U.S.-style standard adopted in Hong Kong). See also Rachelle Alterman,
When the Right to Compensation for “Regulatory Takings” Goes to the Extreme: The Case of Israel, 6
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negative externalities and redistribution concerns arising from the
use of natural resources, even when the natural resource in ques-
tion is privately owned.256 In a previous case study on emerging
natural resources and the nationalization of wind and sunlight,257 it
was discovered that, regardless of whether the common law ad
coelum rule258 is applied to wind and sunlight, their utilization is sus-
ceptible to all sorts of restrictions (whether under common law259
or via regulatory powers260) and taxes.261
What distinguishes atmospheric moisture from both wind and
sunlight is the manner in which the resource is used. Capture of the
available wind and sunlight over a plot of land is typically achieved
through physical installations (wind turbines and solar panels) on
the particular plot of land. Although such resource utilization can
generate negative externalities to adjacent land262—including nega-
tively affecting similar utilization of the resource on neighboring
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 121, 152 (2007) (discussing of the Israeli regulatory-takings
doctrine, which is substantially more generous to private-property owners).
256. Chen & Cui, supra note 4, at 127. See also Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 250–52
(2015) (arguing that the expanded notion of regulatory takings in current U.S. jurispru-
dence is not only unjustifiable on constitutional grounds, but also unduly constrains much-
needed regulatory responses to environmental problems).
257. Chen & Cui, supra note 4.
258. Rule, supra note 3, at 806; DuVivier, supra note 102, at 75–77; Spranking, supra note
2, at 982–85.
259. Nuisance is the prime example, see MURPHY, supra note 50, at 5–7; Mortensen et al.,
supra note 50, at 223. However, the public-trust doctrine has also been employed to restrict
wind- and solar-energy projects. See Alexandra B. Klass, Renewable Energy and the Public Trust
Doctrine, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1027–32 (2012); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions
of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 631, 633–56 (1986).
260. Patricia Salkin, The Key to Unlocking the Power of Small Scale Renewable Energy: Local
Land Use Regulation, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 339, 354–60 (2012); Troy A. Rule, Renewable
Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1226–28 (2010). For a discussion of environ-
mental lawsuits that have challenged renewable-energy projects by using environmental laws
such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water
Act, National Historic Preservation Act, and others, see John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of
Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 73–88 (2013). For a comparative
discussion of regulatory approaches in other countries, see Mortensen et al., supra note 50.
261. The tax could be a general tax on the profits arising from resource utilization: Mor-
riss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 49, at 757. There could also be specific natural-resource
tax. Wang, supra note 235, at 455–56 (discussing Wyoming’s tax on wind energy production,
a rarity). See also Keith J. Brewer, Stephen E. Hamilton & Richard A. Westin, Economic Ap-
proaches to Nonrenewable Resource Taxation, 11 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 175, 188–93
(1995) (discussing the various methods of taxing natural resources from an economic per-
spective); Walter Hellerstein, Political Perspectives on State and Local Taxation of Natural
Resources, 19 GA. L. REV. 31, 32–35 (1984) (discussing the various natural resources taxes
implemented by the states and the political controversies that accompanied them).
262. Nagle, supra note 260, at 66–69; Matthew K. McCasland, Windy City Heat: How Wind
Energy Can Help Power Illinois Into the Future, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y. 167, 182–85
(2012); Rule, supra note 260, at 1238.
FALL 2016] A Case Study on Owning Atmospheric Moisture 91
land263—no direct physical intrusion into adjacent lands is usually
necessary to harness the resources.
Not so with weather modification activities. Successfully effecting
a desired weather phenomenon on a given plot of land usually re-
quires undertaking physical activities over the surrounding land.
Optimally timing and siting the dispersal of chemicals for cloud
seeding requires the would-be weather modifier to consider the di-
rection and strength of prevailing winds as well as the time it will
take for the induced atmospheric effect to manifest itself.264 And
the structure of the cloud system forms yet another important varia-
ble that impacts where the chemical should be dispersed.265 In
addition, even the smallest weather-modification operations require
treatment over several hundred hectares (several square kilome-
ters).266 When inducing snow, moreover, the targeted area for
weather modification may be far upstream from the intended bene-
ficiaries, who seek to benefit from extra water when the snow
eventually melts.267 These cross-boundary concerns are amply evi-
denced in Nd Atmos. Res. Bd. V. Bnrc,268 a judicial review of litigation
concerning a Montana weather-modification permit. There, the ap-
plicant for the permit (the state of North Dakota) wanted to
conduct cloud seeding as far as 20 miles inside the Montana border
in order to increase precipitation within North Dakota.269
Thus, the legal constraints that private rights to atmospheric
moisture impose on the weather-modification regulatory regime
are those of physical takings, not simply of regulatory takings. In
essence, a typical weather-modification license or permit authorizes
a private party to physically access and interfere with atmospheric
moisture over land that does not belong to the intended benefi-
ciaries. If no provisions are made to protect the property rights of
these landowners (be it a property-rule veto or liability-rule com-
pensation), then a regulatory regime that authorizes weather-
modification activities beyond the property lines of the applicant
263. For example, wake turbulence from a wind turbine can diminish wind flow to wind
turbines located downwind. See Alan J. Alexander, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural
Resource and a Severable Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429, 438 (2011); Yael Lifshitz-
Goldberg, Gone with the Wind? The Potential Tragedy of the Common Wind, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 435, 455–60 (2010).
264. COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 16; Czys, DeFelice & Griffith, supra note 87, at
66–70.
265. COTTON & PIELKE, supra note 14, at 14–15, 24; Czys, DeFelice & Griffith, supra note
87, at 69–70.
266. DeFelice & Keyes, supra note 97, at 1.
267. Keyes, supra note 82, at 13–14.
268. 1992 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 60 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1992).
269. Id., at *2.
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risks being construed as an unconstitutional taking without
compensation.270
IV. STATE PROPERTY AND TRANSITION
The findings of the case study discussed in the previous Part
highlight an important aspect of transition. The various forms of
ownership bring significantly different legal impediments to the use
of particular regulatory controls. That is, choosing to implement a
certain property rights arrangement may preclude choosing certain
control mechanisms. In the case of atmospheric moisture, state
ownership neither limits nor influences the regulatory regime,
whereas private-property rights require distinct accommodation
from the regulatory regime. Building on this finding, this Part of
the Article examines more closely the relative ease of transitions
among the different forms of property ownership. It argues that
state ownership enjoys two distinct advantages over other arrange-
ments: first, state ownership is the easiest form from which to
transition to other property rights arrangements; and second, state
ownership allows more holistic transitions, given that an optimal
transition typically requires modifying both the form of property
ownership and the corresponding control mechanisms.
A. Ease of Transition
Three dimensions of state property facilitate transition to other
property rights regimes. First, and perhaps most obvious, is the le-
gal dimension, which was examined in Part III.C. Notably, the
constitutional protection of private property might apply to certain
communally-owned property and anticommons rights held by pri-
vate entities, particularly if accompanied by an expanded definition
270. In this respect, a comparison can be made with the controversies surrounding so-
called “right-to-farm” legislation, which sought to limit the nuisance claims that could be
brought against a farm owner. Although such legislation is most often paired with a regula-
tory regime that prescribes minimum standards of agricultural practices that a farmer must
comply with to enjoy protection from nuisance suits, such legislation arguably infringes on
the property rights of neighboring landowners, by permitting a farm owner to infringe upon
their right of quiet enjoyment. Accordingly, some state courts have invalided right-to-farm
statutes as unconstitutional takings, given the extensive immunity to nuisance suits they be-
stow upon farmers. See Jason Jordan, A Pig in the Parlor of Food on the Table: Is Texas’s Right to
Farm Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy Ensuring
Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 943, 957–63 (2010); Terence J. Centner, Govern-
ments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 87, 117–35 (2006).
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of private property.271 In addition to the lack of incentives (and per-
haps standing) for an individual citizen to litigate the improper
disposition of state property (compared with the willingness and
ability of property owners to assert their legal rights against state
interference), there are significantly fewer legal obstacles to transi-
tions away from state property.
Second, political opposition to transfers of state property tends
to be less vigorous than opposition to the modification of private-
property rights. Although changes to property rights arrangements
may be efficient, redistribution among the existing and new entitle-
ment holders is almost inevitable, usually to the detriment of
existing entitlement holders.272 Public-choice theory predicts that
interest-group politics will lead to outcomes favorable to well-organ-
ized minority interest groups, as their stakes in the political
outcome outweigh those of the general public.273 When the losses
that the transition causes to existing entitlement holders are con-
centrated, and when the gains of the new entitlement holders are
diffuse, political opposition to the transition is likely to outweigh
political support (even before cognitive bias against loss aversion is
factored in274). From this perspective, the political inertia marking
different types of property rights transitions is highly asymmetric,
with transitions from a more diffused ownership structure to a con-
centrated ownership structure being more politically feasible than
the reverse. Thus, public-choice theory implies that, all else being
equal, transitions away from private property and anticommons to
271. See Frederick E. Ellrod III & Nicholas P. Miller, Property Rights, Federalism, and the
Public Rights-of-Way, 26 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 475, 483–85, 500–01 (2003) (arguing that public
rights-of-way enjoyed by local communities are proprietary interests whose uncompensated
deprivation would violate the Takings Clause). It is also worth noting that eminent domain of
publicly owned property by a higher-level government is also subject to the just-compensa-
tion requirement, despite no express reference to public property. See United States v. 50
Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Com-
pensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 831 (1989).
272. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 433; Wyman, supra note 12, at 123–25.
273. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 131–33 (3rd ed. 2003); Samuel Is-
sacharoff, Democracy and Collective Decision Making, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 231, 257–58 (2008);
James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Govern-
ment, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 19 (James D. Gwartney & Richard
E. Wagner eds. 1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 294–95 (1988).
274. See Kevin Arceneaux, Cognitive Biases and the Strength of Political Arguments, 56 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 271, 272–73, 282–83 (2012) (discussing the cognitive bias in favor of political argu-
ments framed as loss aversion); J. D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 L. & PHIL. 393,
395–408, 433–34 (2005) (discussing the various types of cognitive bias and arguing that cer-
tain forms of state decision-debiasing intervention promotes individual autonomy).
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commons are less probable than transitions in the opposite
direction.275
At first glance, the political inertia against transitions away from
state-owned property may seem significant. After all, there is a sin-
gle clearly identified entitlement holder (the state) to the property.
But the state at the same time is an entity that purports to represent
the most diffuse of interests: the entire population.276 It is precisely
the structure of the owner, a single entity representing extremely
diffuse interests, that minimizes political opposition. Individual
losses to the purported beneficiaries (i.e., the individual citizens)
are often minimal and physically remote. All else equal, this diffuse-
ness severely reduces both the incentives for, and capabilities of,
opposing transitions away from state ownership. Conversely, the ex-
istence of a formal governing entity representing the diffuse
interests also solves the collective-action and holdout problems that
might otherwise hinder transitions.277 It is true, of course, that state
property is sometimes subject to ideological constraints that can
galvanize and empower political opposition against certain transi-
tions. Examples range from the well-known (for example, socialist
hostility to privatization278) to the more subtle (how association of
public access with public property can block adoption of market-
based allocation mechanisms for a public road279). And ideological
275. Cf. David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652,
654–56 (2010) (noting the disparity between the intense public reaction over the perceived
deprivation of private property in Kelo vis-a`-vis the public indifference regarding the massive
removal of intellectual property from the public domain). See also Heller, supra note 9, at 631
(“private property emerges more successfully in resources that begin transition with a single
owner holding a near-standard bundle of market legal rights”). See generally Levmore, supra
note 12, at 433–50 (discussing the several examples of devolution—though usually only par-
tial—away from private property).
276. See, e.g.,  [Constitution of the Tunisian Republic], 2014, art. 13 (“Natu-
ral resources belong to the people of Tunisia. The state exercises sovereignty over them in
the name of the people.”); XIAN FA [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], 2004,
art. 9 (“All mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land,
beaches and other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people”).
See Heller, supra note 25, at xvi (“State property resembles private property in that there is a
single decision maker but differs in that resource use is directed through some process that
is, in principle, responsive to the needs of the public as a whole.”).
277. See Banner, supra note 60, at 362–65; Field, supra note 24, at 335–40.
278. In China, for example, publicly owned property continues to be viewed as a funda-
mental pillar of the Chinese state even in the midst of the transition to a “socialist market
economy” and the increased recognition of the economic contributions from privately
owned entities. See Article 3, Wuquan fa [Property Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.); Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige 30 nian
huigu yu zhanwang [30 YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA: REFLECTING AND LOOKING
AHEAD ] 42 (Wei liqun ed., 2008).
279. See Carlos Sun, The Toll Road Not Taken: Could the One Option Less Used Make a Differ-
ence?, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 280, 284 (2012); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill,
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constraints are by no means unique to state-owned property; they
may similarly impact other property rights arrangements.280
Third, and perhaps least appreciated, state ownership of a partic-
ular resource or property will invariably involve forms of property
rights transition. This aspect could actually be garnered from the
definition of state ownership vis-a`-vis other property rights arrange-
ments such as private property and commons. The classic
theoretical trilogy of “ownership” distinguishes between three ideal
types of ownership: private property, commons property, and state
property.281 Under this model, a property or resource is state-owned
when the state is the entity tasked with managing that property or
resource.282 When a different arrangement of property rights would
lead to more efficient resource utilization, the state, as manager of
the resource, should in theory adopt those property rights arrange-
ments as a resource-management strategy, in order to advance the
interests of the state.283 The state’s interests would be advanced
from such socially efficient transitions either through revenue gen-
eration (whether direct, at the time of the initial allocation, or
indirect, through taxes on receipts or income) or by the theoretical
conceptualization of the interest of the state as encompassing the
overall social welfare within its jurisdiction. Notably, although the
former (i.e., revenue generation capturing the efficiency gain)
might be possible for certain transitions from more concentrated to
Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication
Doctrine, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 1417, 1521 (2011).
280. See Butler, supra note 63, at 876–90 (critically discussing the increasingly powerful
narratives by private property rights advocates and arguing that these advocates’ influence
increasingly limits the flexibility and ability of government to promote public goods).
281. Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
511, 530 (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 79, 82–86 (2001); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 37–42
(1988). For a recent critical comparison of this trilogy with other property theories, see Sarah
E. Hamill, Private Rights to Public Property: The Evolution of Common property in Canada, 58 MC-
GILL L.J. 365, 369–80 (2012). See also Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123,
129 (2001) (adding two further categories to the trilogy: “commons” (property available to
all mankind) and “regulatory property” (“a property right created and allocated by a govern-
ment entity”)).
282. See Heller, supra note 25, at xvi; Rose, supra note 41, at 719–20; Demsetz, supra note
24, at 354.
283. See Jianlin Chen & Jiongzhe Cui, More Market-Oriented Than the United States And More
Socialist Than China: A Comparative Public Property Story of Singapore, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1,
54 (2014) (“Public property, the otherwise sacred poster child of socialist regimes, is simply a
form of property. If market mechanisms represent the most effective form of property alloca-
tion to ensure that public property is not squandered—and often they do—then an emphasis
on public property protection will necessarily imply the widespread use of market
mechanisms.”).
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more diffused property rights arrangements,284 the latter (i.e., a
broad definition of “self-interest” to include social gains and losses)
inevitably decrease as the property rights arrangements become
more concentrated. In practice, this dynamic is much more preva-
lent than is commonly presumed, as will be discussed in
conjunction with the next Part’s dispelling of the undeserved asso-
ciation of state property with socialism.
B. Holistic Transition
Closely related to ease of transition is another benefit of state
ownership: when a state attempts to implement more efficient re-
source-management, it can typically effect simultaneous changes in
both ownership and control mechanisms. Thus, the state can better
coordinate and calibrate the two. The manifestation of coordina-
tion can be seen in the U.S.’s management of federally-owned
lands. Throughout the history of federal ownership of land, land
has been allocated and utilized in a wide variety of ways. Ap-
proaches have ranged from full transfers of ownership rights to
private entities—either to generate revenue through sale or to serve
certain government policy objectives (e.g., settlement of the West
via the Homestead Act)285—to allocation or licensing schemes.
Under the latter schemes, the state retains title to the land, but pri-
vate entities are allowed to acquire property rights interests, usually
upon satisfaction of statutory conditions tailored to specific policy
considerations.286
With other property rights arrangements, by contrast, altering
the control mechanisms is often the only practical way to achieve
certain outcomes, because of the inertia against changes to existing
ownership structure. Consider, for example, private land that con-
tains an ecologically sensitive habitat for endangered species and
other natural heritages. Given the stark misalignment of incentives
284. See Levmore, supra note 12, at 426–29 (discussing how “private properties, with re-
stricted access supporting various residential and commercial uses, might have turned into a
contiguous green belt, with fairly open access but quite limited use”).
285. Huber, supra note 69, at 1023–24; Michael I. Jeffery, Public Lands Reform: A Reluctant
Leap into the Abyss, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 82–89 (1996). For a historical overview, see Paul W.
Gates, An Overview of American Land Policy, 50 AGRIC. HIST. 213, 217–20 (1976).
286. For an examination of the different types of private interests that may be created in
publicly owned resources and that may be deemed as property for the purpose of the Takings
Clause, see Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in
Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 1, 12–19, 64–65 (1987); see also Ellrod & Miller, supra
note 271, at 504–05 (observing that government can act as either a regulator or a property
owner, and noting that the two functions are easily confused).
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and benefits (preserving such lands would be of great social value,
while developing them would bring largely private gains), the opti-
mal combination of property ownership and control mechanism in
such a situation would arguably be either public ownership paired
with a limited quota or paid licenses to private entities for pre-
scribed use of or access to the land,287 or communal ownership
paired with mechanisms that allow the community to derive suffi-
cient economic benefit from preservation (for example, by allowing
ecotourism), thus creating incentives for sustainable management
of the natural heritage.288 But because of the high costs of transi-
tioning away from private ownership—given both the
compensation that must be paid for a taking under eminent do-
main and the other sources of inertia discussed in the previous
section—regulatory controls (e.g., the Endangered Species Act)
will be the only practically available option.289
Indeed, the greater the ability to coordinate ownership and con-
trol mechanisms, the better the prospects of implementing the
optimal resource-management strategy. As observed in Part I.B.,
supra, the ownership structure alone, whether commons, private
property, anticommons, or otherwise, does not determine whether
the ultimate outcome is “tragedy.” Appropriate control mechanisms
can very often mitigate the externalities that might otherwise arise
from the ownership structure. Even so, ownership structure and
control mechanisms are never perfect substitutes. Each strategy will
have relative advantages and disadvantages, which will vary accord-
ing to the characteristics of the resource in question.290 When, for
example, the property has boundaries that are easy to verify and the
287. This is essentially the modern management strategy for national parks, which is de-
signed to combat both the diminishment of enjoyment of park visitors and the degradation
of the natural environment caused by overcrowding arising from increased demand. See Cath-
erine M. Pickering & Ralf C. Buckley, Swarming the Summit: Managing Tourists at Mt Kosciuszko,
Australia, 23 MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 230, 232–33 (2003); Jeffery, supra note 285, at 132–33; see
also COLE, supra note 42, at 150–51 (highlighting the inadequacies of private property com-
pared to public/state ownership in protecting endangered species).
288. Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of local community owner-
ship, as well as the role that such ownership and local community management can play in
sustainable natural resource exploitation. See, e.g.. Julie A. Silva & Lila K. Khatiwada, Trans-
forming Conservation into Cash? Nature Tourism in Southern Africa, 61 AFR. TODAY 17, 20–22
(2014); N. Leader-Williams, Animal Conservation, Carbon and Sustainability, 360 PHIL. TRANSAC-
TIONS: MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL AND ENGINEERING SCI. 1787, 1791–92 (2002).
289. For a critical assessment of the limited effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act,
see Jonathan H. Adler, The Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use Con-
trols, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: EMINENT DOMAIN AND REGULATORY TAKINGS RE-EXAMINED 187,
189–94 (Bruce L. Benson ed. 2010); Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of
Thinking about the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10–33 (1996).
290. Smith, supra note 52, at 468–74.
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property allows a broad range of viable uses (e.g., small-scale agri-
cultural land in the pre-industrial era), granting ownership is likely
to be a lower-cost method of coordinating potentially competing
uses and mitigating wasteful rent dissipation.291 Conversely, when
the full effect of the use does not fall within a readily identifiable
property boundary (as with air pollution, for example), or when
economies of scale discourage discrete ownership (as with grazing
grounds), control mechanisms must play a greater role.292 Thus,
achieving optimal management strategies—whether initially or in
response to a changing resource utilization environment—will
often mean changing both property ownership and control
mechanisms.
Scholars have increasingly realized the importance of such “holis-
tic” transition. In advocating greater and more precise exclusionary
rules in favor of property owners over the low-altitude airspace
above their land, Troy Rule has observed that when state legisla-
tures enact statutes to create such property rights, the legislators
“could easily structure new airspace rights statutes so as not to pre-
clude the reasonable use of drones and other low-flying aircraft in
certain emergency response settings . . . . [and] establish licensing
processes for small drones and their operators comparable to ex-
isting requirements for automobile driving.”293 In a similar vein,
Amy Sinden has argued against scholars’ rigid dichotomization of
privatization and government regulation, because it is almost im-
possible to create property rights that fully internalize all
externalities or fully eliminate transaction costs. Sinden argues
against viewing privatization as the conceptual opposite of govern-
ment regulation because government regulation of the quantity
and nature of resource use remains necessary even for purported
“property rights” or “market” solutions to tragedy-of-the-commons
problems.294 Yet even in giving voice to the otherwise laudable rec-
ognition that property rights and regulation can (and should) go
hand in hand, these studies fail to articulate one important assump-
tion—that it is permissible and feasible for the state to institute or
rearrange property rights in the first place. And as the above case
study indicates, the degree of such permissibility and feasibility var-
ies in accordance with the initial property rights arrangement.
291. See id. at, 474–75. See also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights
to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1869–84 (2006) (discussing how information costs affect
the resource owner’s choice of the different exclusion strategies).
292. Butler, supra note 52, at 1693–94; Smith, supra note 52, at 474–75.
293. Rule, supra note 52, at 202–03.
294. See generally Sinden, supra note 34, at 546–66.
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C. Caveats to State Ownership of Emerging Natural Resources
Given the above argument that state ownership facilitates both
easier and more holistic transitions, this Article’s ultimate conclu-
sion should come as anything but a surprise: state ownership is the
optimal form of property rights arrangement for emerging natural
resources. In particular, the greater the uncertainty surrounding
the long-term viability of the present patterns of resource utiliza-
tion, the stronger the case for state ownership.
Still, three important caveats to this conclusion warrant further
mention.
First, transition is particularly relevant only when there is uncer-
tainty, whether uncertainty about the full consequences of the
current form of resource utilization or uncertainty about the pat-
tern of resource utilization in the near future. It becomes less
compelling to factor in the possibility of transition if the resource-
utilization pattern is stable and its consequences sufficiently well
understood. In the case of atmospheric moisture, for example, if
weather-modification technologies were to advance to a point
where a weather modifier could effectively and cheaply divert at-
mospheric moisture to her land and deprive nearby lands of
needed rain, there might be a strong case for a property rights ar-
rangement incorporating a strong private veto right over any
interference with atmospheric moisture one is “naturally” entitled
to, particularly if advances in meteorological technology were to al-
low precise identification and tracking of atmospheric moisture.
The flexibility of transition afforded by state ownership would be of
little value at that stage.
Second, a distinction must be made between a) natural resources
that humans have only recently harnessed on an industrial scale
(such as atmospheric moisture, wind, sunlight, and underground
pore space295); and b) natural resources that can be physically pos-
sessed with relative ease but only recently became of significant
economic value (such as the numerous near-surface mineral ores
that came into demand after technological breakthroughs in ex-
traction296 or utilization297). This Article’s argument primarily
295. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
296. One example is oil sand, which has increasingly become economically viable thanks
to more efficient extraction and refining, as well as high oil prices. See Clinton N. Westman,
Cautionary Tales: Making and Breaking Community in the Oil Sands Region, 38 CANADIAN J. SOC.
211, 215–18 (2013); Atkins & MacFadyen, supra note 1, at 78–81. Another earlier example is
aluminum; although aluminum ores were always in plentiful supply, the ores were of no
economic significance before the development of low-cost electrochemical extraction meth-
ods. See James Ashby, The Aluminum Legacy: The History of the Metal and its Role in Architecture,
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addresses the former, not the latter. The key distinction between
these two types of emerging natural resources is that, with the lat-
ter, there normally already exists an established property rights
regime (usually one based on land ownership) to be applied when
the rising economic value of the resource begins to generate legal
disputes. Conversely, the combination of a lack of economic signifi-
cance and prior inability to possess or use the former type of
resource—arguably the “true” emerging natural resource—meant
that for the longest time, the discourse about its ownership (if at
all) was firmly based only in scholarly and theoretical discussions,
with hardly any practical implication or legal manifestation.298 The
distinction does not mean that transition is less relevant for the lat-
ter type of resource, however. Even though the substance in
question has been readily possessable from time immemorial and is
perfectly analogous to other conventional natural resources, new
resource-utilization patterns and changing socioeconomic circum-
stances might well call for a different property rights regime.299
Instead, the reason for the caveat is simply this: because there is
15 CONSTRUCTION HIST. 79, 80–81 (1999); Colin J. Smithells, On the Manufacture, Properties
and Applications of Aluminium and its Alloys, 98 J. ROYAL SOC’Y ARTS 822, 823–25 (1950).
297. Demand for rare earth mineral ores—used in a variety of novel electronics and
green technologies—has dramatically increased over the past two decades. Robert F. Service,
Nations Move to Head Off Shortages of Rare Earths, 327 SCIENCE 1596, 1596 (2010).
298. For example, Roman jurists’ designation of air as res communes (that is, as a thing that
cannot be legally owned and is subject to the right of enjoyment by everyone) was practically
insignificant for a very long period of time, given the state of available technology prior to
the Industrial Revolution . See Rose, supra note 106, at 93–94; BORKOWSKI, supra note 106, at
143. But with the advent of large-scale greenhouse gas emissions, one might argue that the
absorption capacity of the Earth’s atmosphere for greenhouse gases has been used to satura-
tion by the industrialized North. See Winter, supra note 8, at 137; Jeremy Baskin, The Impossible
Necessity of Climate Justice?, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 424, 430 (2009).
299. A good example is the renewed vigor of the public-trust doctrine in the U.S., which
seeks to constrain the landowner from using the land or exploiting the resources on the land
on the ground that certain resources, although formally owned by the landowner, are forever
to be held in trust for present and future generations. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paul-
sen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1441–51 (2013); Klass, supra note
259, at 1027–32; Lazarus, supra note 259, at 633–56. Although ostensibly a common law doc-
trine traceable back to Roman law, the vastly expanded application of the doctrine in
modern times runs counter to its historical roots. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconve-
nient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 4–9 (2007).
For a detailed historical deconstruction of the circumstances surrounding the landmark case
of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110 (1892), which laid the
precedential groundwork for the American public-trust doctrine, see generally Joseph D. Kear-
ney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in
Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). Yet another example would be newly discov-
ered antiquities, for which a hybrid solution of “possessory estate and future interest” may be
preferable both to the conventional law of finders and to state ownership. Peter T. Wendel,
Protecting Newly Discovered Antiquities: Thinking Outside the “Fee Simple” Box, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1015, 1051–62 (2007).
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already an established property rights regime, declaring state own-
ership of the resource will itself be a transition, with all the
accompanying challenges (particularly from inertia). Overcoming
that inertia simply for the sake of an easier transition sometime in
the future would not appear to be categorically more efficient than
simply trying for a single transition in the future.300
Third, a certain level of institutional competence and good gov-
ernance is required to realize the transition benefits of state
property. Transitioning away from state property is a form of state
management of natural resources, and as such is susceptible to well-
recognized problems such as rent-seeking, corruption, and transac-
tion costs.301 For states where governance is so degraded that public
management of natural resources is a mere fac¸ade for corruption,
or where the state is utterly incapable of enforcing enacted laws and
policies, any attempt at transition undertaken by a state would likely
be misguided, ineffective, or both. That does not mean, however,
that private property is normatively preferable in such circum-
stances. Private property—because it, too, is arguably a form of
state institution302—would be similarly adversely affected by failures
of governance. In this respect, Daniel Fitzpatrick has observed that
the lack of governance capabilities in developing countries has re-
sulted in a profound conundrum: formal private-property rights fail
to completely exclude prior customary rights of the local commu-
nity, while prior informal (and often quite efficient) governance
fails to operate effectively when its norms run counter to formal
law.303 Similarly, governance failure will afflict transitions in the
control mechanisms governing private property. A government that
corruptly allocates state-owned assets to certain minority interest
groups is just as likely to enact regulations to benefit those same
interest groups.304 Thus, this third caveat is simply a different way of
300. Still, there is one possible argument for an early transition to state ownership: transi-
tioning away from private property is easier when there remains considerable uncertainty
about the utilization patterns and economic value of the resource.
301. Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich
Countries Through Middle-Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 252–53 (2013); Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Sine´ad Hunt, Transparency and Business Advantage: The Impact of Interna-
tional Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
433, 459–62 (2012); COLE, supra note 42, at 38–40, 87–93; Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra
note 49, at 774.
302. Chen & Cui, supra note 283, at 46–47; see Rose, supra note 41, at 719 (“[W]e rely on
governmental management of our preeminent system of resource management—private
property—and we might view the entire private property regime as a ‘public property’ owned
and managed by governmental bodies.”).
303. Fitzpatrick, supra note 24, at 1010–21.
304. Chen & Cui, supra note 4, at 116.
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saying that all property rights arrangements (including state prop-
erty) in a failed or utterly corrupt state are normatively ambiguous,
if not perilous.
V. READOPTING THE NEGLECTED TRIPLET
This case study has a broader message. Because state ownership is
not inexorably correlated with more onerous regulatory controls,
and because state property facilitates easier and more holistic tran-
sitions between property rights arrangements, state ownership
deserves a thoroughgoing reexamination—both practical (how it
actually operates across jurisdictions) and theoretical (whether it
may be normatively desirable in more contexts than is commonly
thought).
Despite being one of the three original ideal property types,305
state property does not have much standing in the current litera-
ture. The risks of governance failures in the state management of
resources have often been deployed as an argument against state
ownership generally,306 while at the same time Michael Heller and
other scholars in the law-and-economics tradition have explicitly
downplayed the theoretical value and practical significance of state-
owned property.307 In a certain sense, such neglect (and even dis-
dain) is understandable. Given the backdrop of the Cold War, state
property for a long time was (and to a certain extent, continues to
be) overtly associated with socialism.308 This association—in con-
junction with the global demise of Soviet and other socialist
regimes and with the widespread privatization that followed309—
305. Wyman, supra note 281, at 530; Heller, supra note 281, at 82–86; WALDRON, supra
note 281, at 37–42.
306. Compare, e.g., Wieland, supra note 301, at 253–55; Weinthal & Luong, supra note 66,
at 38–46; with Morriss, Meiners & Dorchak, supra note 49, at 764–89 (arguing that a nondis-
cretionary, straightforward administrative system for allocating mineral rights to private
entities helps mitigate the perils of public resources mismanagement); Rose, supra note 41, at
719–20 (discussing how the efficacy of state resource management is premised on critical
assumptions such as ability of state to correctly identify market failure, expertise in exercising
state power, lack of corruption).
307. E.g., Heller, supra note 25, at xvi; BARZEL, supra note 25, at 71.
308. Heller, supra note 281, at 82–86; WALDRON, supra note 281, at 40–41.
309. See EDWARD W. WALKER, DISSOLUTION: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BREAKUP OF THE SOVIET
UNION 137-172 (2003) (detailing the events that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991). For critical discussion of the subsequent market reforms, see Peter Rutland, Mission
Impossible? The IMF and the Failure of the Market Transition in Russia, 25 REV. INT’L STUD. 183,
185–88, 190–91 (1999); Theodore P. Gerber & Michael Hout, More Shock Than Therapy: Mar-
ket Transition, Employment, and Income in Russia, 1991-1995, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1, 35–38 (1998);
Victor Nee & Rebecca Matthews, Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming
State Socialism, 22 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 401, 417–19 (1996).
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provided ample ammunition for those who see state property as in-
herently inferior to private property, the trademark property rights
regime of the victorious West.310
Nonetheless, the association of state property with socialism and
the resulting scholarly neglect of state property are unfortunate, for
at least two reasons. First, notwithstanding the end of the Cold War,
state property remains an important property rights arrangement
around the globe; constitutional declarations of state ownership
over natural resources remain common.311 More relevantly, and
perhaps surprisingly, state property remains an important property
rights arrangement in the United States. As shown in Part III, state
ownership of atmospheric moisture has been explicitly declared by
one-third of the states with regulatory regimes governing weather
modification.312 Given the lack of federal regulation in this area,313
more states might adopt this approach when instituting their own
regulatory regimes. Beyond the seemingly quirky nature of emerg-
ing natural resources such as atmospheric moisture, a large portion
of real property—the classic paradigm of private property—in the
U.S. is state-owned; the federal government alone owns nearly one-
third of the total U.S. land mass.314
Second, and more importantly, the “taint” of socialism obscures
the fact that, in both theory and practice, declaring a natural re-
source to be state property does not necessarily end in extensive
and intrusive state intervention in the utilization of the resource. As
the above case study shows, there is no clear correlation between
state ownership of atmospheric moisture and the regulatory regime
that accompanies it.315 Close scrutiny of the actual effects of state
ownership—or the absence of such effects—reveals that this seem-
ingly counter-intuitive result should be unsurprising.316 Tellingly, a
close examination of the issue of relative ease of transitions reveals
that state ownership of a particular resource will invariably involve
forms of property rights transition. A state in managing its state-
310. Cf. Paul B. Stephan III, The Fall—Understanding the Collapse of the Soviet System, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 17, 19–30 (1995) (discussing and rebutting the widely perceived notion
that the fall of the Soviet Union is evidence of the failure of Soviet communism).
311. See, e.g.,  [Constitution of the Tunisian Republic], 2014, art. 13; XIAN FA
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], 2004, art. 9. See Alexandra R. Harrington,
Natural Integrity: the Relationship Between Anti-Corruption Laws and Natural Resource Protections in
Latin America, 17 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 13, 19–20 (2009) (surveying the constitutional
provisions on natural resources in Latin America countries).
312. Supra Part IV.B.
313. Supra Part IV.A.1.
314. Huber, supra note 69, at 993.
315. Supra Part IV.C.1.
316. Supra Part IV.C.3.
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owned property might consciously choose property rights transi-
tion—including privatization—as a management strategy.317
Indeed, a whole host of methods can be utilized by the state to
achieve de facto privatization or transitions to other forms of prop-
erty rights even when there are powerful legal and ideological
constraints inhibiting dissolution of formal state ownership. This
dynamic was touched on above, in discussing the myriad private
property interests that the U.S. federal government has created on
lands that formally remain under full federal ownership.318 Even in
China, where the Socialist Constitution mandates state ownership
of urban land,319 a system of land-use rights has evolved that  allows
for possession, construction, and transfer of such land.320 For all
practical purposes, this system is equivalent to a leasehold regime
like the one that prevails in the highly developed economies of
Hong Kong321 and Singapore.322 Moreover, the Chinese system has
prevented neither the emergence of a vibrant property market in
urban land nor a florescence of commercial activity in China’s ur-
ban centers.323
Thus, although aggressive management by government bureau-
crats or regulators is anything but the optimal strategy for
managing natural resources management in many scenarios, state
property should not be scornfully or unceremoniously discarded
317. Supra Part V.A. In this regard, it is worth noting that the substantial land holdings of
the U.S. federal government were acquired under the assumption that the land would be
eventually sold or otherwise allocated to private entities. Huber, supra note 69, at 1022–26; see
Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 50–51 (1991).
318. See supra notes 282–283 and accompanying text.
319. XIAN FA [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] 2004, art. 10.
320. Art. 135–51, Property Law, supra note 278. See Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban
Land Revolution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 330 (2014) (discussing how the current Chinese
property regime in the urban area “mimic[s] in many important respects a regime of private
ownership of land”). For general discussion of the nature and status of land-use rights in
China, see Wuquan faxue [PROPERTY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE] 206–55 (Zhang Yihua & Luo
Xiaojing eds., 2010).
321. Clarke, supra note 320, at 345–49; Lawrence W. C. Lai, A Model of Planning by Con-
tract: Integrating Comprehensive State Planning, Freedom of Contract, Public Participation and Fidelity,
81 TOWN PLANNING REV. 647, 663–67 (2010); Berry F.C. Hsu, Asset Quality in HKSAR’s Real
Estate Markets: A Public Policy and Legal Analysis, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 263, 264–66 (2002).
322. Sock-Yong Phang, Economic Development and the Distribution of Land Rents in Singapore:
A Georgist Implementation, 55 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 489, 491–96 (1996); N. KHUBLALL, COMPUL-
SORY LAND ACQUISITION SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 4 (2nd ed. 1994)
323. See Christopher K. Hsee, Jean-Pierre Dube´ & Yan Zhang, The Prominence Effect in
Shanghai Apartment Prices, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 133, 133 (2008); Shitong Qiao, Small Property,
Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 197, 204–11 (2015) (discussing the
booming urban real estate market in China, both in urban land, where such a market is
formally allowed, and rural land, where there is more ambiguity about the legality of transac-
tions in land).
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from normative and descriptive discussions of property rights. Con-
tinuous and active state intervention is but one approach that a
state may adopt for managing state property. Indeed, as one previ-
ous comparative case study revealed, the emphasis on safeguarding
publicly-owned resources led Singapore to adopt market- and prop-
erty-based solutions to address traffic congestion; these solutions
have achieved superior outcomes in terms of efficiency and redistri-
bution.324 A better appreciation of the practical operation and
possible merits of state property, in tandem with continued re-
search in the vein of the present Article, will open up further vistas
in the exploration of optimal property rights.
CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years, the vastly accelerated pace of technologi-
cal advance has fueled a relentless search for new ways to interact
with, and influence, our natural environment. As we confront diffi-
cult decisions about the legal status and normative design of
property rights to ever-increasing categories of emerging natural re-
sources, due consideration must be given to how the ease and
nature of future transitions may be affected by the initial allocation
of property rights. This case study on the ownership of atmospheric
moisture in the United States has revealed that state ownership can
promote surprising regulatory flexibility, in both theory and prac-
tice. More broadly, the case study suggests that, stripped of its
understandable but undeserved socialist baggage, state property de-
serves to play a larger role in the ongoing scholarly conversation.
324. Chen & Cui, supra note 283, at 5–19; see also Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and
Inefficiency with Broad Takings Powers and Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings
Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2010) (explaining how a broad conception of public-
owned resources, one that encompasses the derivative bestowal of benefits, has coupled with
the near obsession about preventing uncompensated transfer to private entities, to help pro-
mote government efficiency and reduce corruption even in the absence of strong legal
protections of private-property rights).
